Showing posts with label Briefing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Briefing. Show all posts

Today’s CDC H3N2v Briefing

 

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Credit Wikipedia

 

# 6486

 

The CDC held a press briefing earlier this afternoon to address the recent increase in H3N2v cases detected across Indiana, Ohio, and today . . . Illinois.  Dr. Joseph Bresee, of the CDC’s Influenza Division, gave a short statement and then took reporter’s questions.

 

The transcript will be posted on the CDC’s media site (HERE) later today.  But for now, a few highlights.

 

As has been widely reported, the number of confirmed H3N2v cases over the past week in the Midwest have increased sharply, from 16 reported last Friday to 145 reported today.

 

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The lone case in Utah occurred in March, and is not part of this current outbreak.

These numbers are likely to increase over the coming days, as more cases get tested.  Individual states are now doing their own lab confirmation, and releasing results, and so the CDC’s numbers will only be updated once a week (Fridays).

 


While a five-fold increase in cases may look alarming, the CDC believes most of these cases come as the result of direct contact with pigs, not from human-to-human transmission.


While they concede that some `limited’ human-to-human transmission may have occurred in this outbreak, the vast majority of cases so far have had some sort of direct contact with pigs, or their environment.

 

As Dr. Bresee emphasized, “This is not a pandemic situation”.

 

All of the recent cases are genetically similar, meaning they are all swine H3N2 with the M (matrix) gene from the 2009 H1N1 virus.

 

It is thought that this M gene may help increase transmissibility of swine viruses among humans, but that this virus has not adapted sufficiently well to humans to be easily spread.

 

This virus remains sensitive to antivirals (oseltamivir and Zanamivir).


At this time, the CDC does not see the need to ask fairs to cancel or restrict the showing of pigs. Instead they are advising those who are in contact with pigs follow these recommendations:

 

  • Wash your hands frequently with soap and running water before and after exposure to animals.
  • Never eat, drink or put things in your mouth in animal areas.
  • Children younger than 5 years, people 65 years and older, pregnant women, and people with certain chronic medical conditions (like asthma, diabetes, heart disease, weakened immune systems, and neurological or neurodevelopmental conditions) are at high risk from serious complications if they get influenza. These people should consider avoiding exposure to pigs and swine barns this summer, especially if sick pigs have been identified.
  • If you have animals – including swine – watch them for signs of illness and call a veterinarian if you suspect they might be sick.
  • Avoid close contact with animals that look or act ill, when possible, and
  • Avoid contact with pigs if you are experiencing flu-like symptoms.

 

 

While there is obviously a lot of concern in the press and among the public, the bottom line is that unless and until this virus adapts sufficiently to spread easily among humans – it doesn’t represent a major public health threat.

 

The hallmark of influenza viruses, of course, is that they are constantly changing.  What we can say was true about a virus yesterday, may not hold true tomorrow.

 

And so public health officials will watch this emerging flu strain carefully for any signs that the situation is changing. 

 

Regardless of how this swine virus plays out, the CDC’s advice to practice good `flu hygiene’ (hand washing, covering coughs & sneezes, staying home if sick) - and to get the flu shot each fall - remain your best strategies against the multiple strains of influenza that circulate each year.

»» Read More

Your Daily Risk Assessment Briefing

 

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Photo Credit- NOAA Know your Risk

 

# 6407

 

Every day busy CEOs along with investors, emergency planners, politicians- and even the President of the United States - receive  specialized Daily Intelligence briefings outlining current or anticipated threats, along with other vital information.

 

While you may not hold the fate of nations, a billion dollar portfolio, or a fortune 500 company in your hands you do have a need to know your risks if you want you and your family to be prepared for a disaster. 

 

And those risks can, and do, change on a daily basis. Particularly those involving climate and weather

 

Fortunately, the Internet makes it easy to create a short list of websites to visit each day (I do so early each morning) that in a few short minutes will give you an early warning of what threats might be expected in the next few days.

 

Depending where you live, and where your personal interests lie, you will probably want to customize your `daily briefing’.  But to get you started, a quick tour of mine.

 

Note: I quickly scan these websites for news, alerts, or forecasts of interest for my region.  I certainly don’t attempt to read them in depth each day. 

 

First stop, NOAAWatch’s Daily Briefing which provides an excellent overview of the natural threats facing the nation.

 

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An excellent example of some of the forecast tools available is this heat index map for this coming weekend, which shows extreme heat conditions are expected in the south eastern United States.

 

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My second stop is usually NOAA’s Storm Prediction Center, which looks ahead as far as a week for areas that may expect severe weather.  At a glance I can see when, and where, weather trouble is expected.

 

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And during hurricane season, I also swing by the National Hurricane Center website each morning (and if there is an active storm, several times each day).

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Since we are approaching the 11 year solar maximum, and since I have a deep interest in astronomy, I also swing by Spaceweather.com or NOAA’s SPACE WEATHER PREDICTION CENTER for the latest on solar activity. 

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As I mentioned last January in Situational Awareness: Google Public Alerts, with the help of Google Earth you can also monitor real-time emergency alerts from all around the world.

 

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And last, but not least, I visit the FEMA Blog to see what they are keeping an eye on.

 

During the day and overnight, I rely on NOAA WEATHER RADIO (NWR) and Twitter to follow @FEMA, @NHC_Atlantic, @NOAA and @CraigAtFEMA for real-time emergency alerts.

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Like having an emergency kit and a first aid kit - having a weather radio is an important part of being prepared.

 

Of course, just knowing about the threats isn’t enough. You have to make use of that information.

 

To learn how to prepare as an individual, family, business owner, or community I would invite you to visit the following sites and use THIS LINK to access some of my preparedness blogs.

 

FEMA http://www.fema.gov/index.shtm

READY.GOV http://www.ready.gov/

AMERICAN RED CROSS http://www.redcross.org/

 


While some people lie awake at night worrying about disasters, I’ve discovered that being prepared is the key to sleeping well.


Preparing is easy.

 

It’s worrying that’s hard.

»» Read More

CDC Telebriefing On Influenza

 

 


# 6176

 

On Friday, Feb. 23rd, the CDC held a briefing on this year’s influenza season by Dr. Joseph Bresee.  Today they’ve posted the transcript, and an mp3 audio file from the briefing.

 

As Dr. Bresee points out, this is the slowest start to an influenza season that we’ve seen in 29 years.

 

And with this slow start has come a much lower incidence of hospitalization, pneumonia, and pediatric flu-related fatalities.


There are signs that the season is starting to pick up, and it is not unheard of for the flu season to peak in March or even April.

 

Dr. Bresee talks about the new WHO vaccine recommendations, and then takes questions from the press, primarily about reasons why the flu season is late this year.

 

 

 

CDC Telebriefing: Influenza Activity Update

Friday, February 23, 2012 at 1PM ET

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Pandemic Briefing Note 21: WHO Responds To Critics

 


# 4638

 

 

Over the past several months the World Health Organization has come under increasing (and in my mind, largely unwarranted) attack from critics who see conspiracies and duplicity behind their declaration of a pandemic last June.


Recently, the BMJ ran an article calling into question the integrity of the experts who serve as advisors to the WHO, suggesting that they might have been influenced by Big Pharma.

 

On Saturday I covered CIDRAP Dissects The WHO Allegations, and on Sunday I offered my latest take on the situation in Of Pandemics, Hurricanes and An Abundance Of Caution.

 

On Tuesday, the WHO released Margaret Chan’s Open Letter To The BMJ.

 

Today we get a lengthy response from the WHO regarding a number of the criticisms levied towards them.   I’ll not post the whole thing, as it runs roughly 2,000 words. 


Follow the link to read it in its entirety.

 

This briefing covers the following points:

 

Is this a genuine pandemic?

Did WHO remove severity from the definition of a pandemic?

Did WHO exaggerate the threat?

Were any WHO pandemic decisions made to increase industry profits?

What safeguards are in place to guard against conflicts of interest?

What is the function of the Emergency Committee and why have the names of its members not been disclosed?

What evidence supports a role for antiviral drugs during an influenza pandemic?

Was a WHO meeting held in 2002 on influenza vaccines and antiviral drugs influenced by industry?

 

The international response to the influenza pandemic: WHO responds to the critics

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 21

Background

10 JUNE 2010 | GENEVA -- On Friday 4 June 2010, the BMJ, formerly British Medical Journal, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) simultaneously released reports critical of the World Health Organization's handling of the H1N1 pandemic. WHO takes the issues and concerns that were raised seriously and wishes to set the record straight on several points.

(Continue . . . )

»» Read More

WHO: Comparing Seasonal And Pandemic Flu Deaths

 


# 4183

 

 

 

One of the prevailing misconceptions about the pandemic of 2009 is that it is `mild’, with some in the media now portraying it as nearly inconsequential.  While the virus has certainly been mild in the majority of people, for a small subset of the population it has been  devastating.


And unlike seasonal flu, this virus has a predilection for younger members of society.   Roughly 90% of the fatalities being recorded from this virus are among those under the age of 65.


It is fair to say that a virus that kills mostly younger adults and children has a greater impact on society than a virus that exacts its greatest toll on those over the age of 80.

 

The WHO (World Health Organization) today has released a briefing note that attempts to explain some of the differences between the estimated deaths each year from seasonal flu and the deaths reported thus far from this pandemic.

 

These are all issues that have been addressed repeatedly in these pages, including in:

 

CDC Updates Their H1N1 Fatality Estimates
Medical Examiner: H1N1 Deaths Understated
When No Number Is Right
Dead Reckoning
Numbers Don’t Tell The Whole Story

 

 

A list of all of the WHO’s Pandemic briefing notes can be found here.

 

Comparing deaths from pandemic and seasonal influenza

 

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 20

22 DECEMBER 2009 | GENEVA -- Efforts to assess the severity of the H1N1 influenza pandemic sometimes compare numbers of confirmed deaths with those estimated for seasonal influenza, either nationally or worldwide. Such comparisons are not reliable for several reasons and can be misleading.

 

Numbers of deaths for seasonal influenza are estimates. They use statistical models designed to calculate so-called excess mortality that occurs during the period when influenza viruses are circulating widely in a given population.

Estimates using all-cause mortality

The models use data, as recorded in death certificates and medical records, indicating mortality from all causes, and compare the number of deaths during epidemics of seasonal influenza with baseline data on deaths during the rest of the year. The assumption is that infections with influenza viruses contribute to the “excess mortality” observed during the influenza season.

 

During epidemics of seasonal influenza, around 90% of deaths occur in the frail elderly, who often suffer from one or more chronic medical conditions. Although influenza can worsen these conditions and contribute to death, testing for influenza viruses is not done in most cases, and deaths are usually attributed to an underlying medical condition.

 

Methods for estimating excess mortality were introduced in the 19th century to capture these influenza-associated deaths that would otherwise be missed. Such estimates have helped counter assumptions that influenza is a mild illness that rarely kills.

Laboratory-confirmed deaths

In contrast, numbers of deaths from pandemic influenza, as notified by national authorities and tabulated by WHO, are laboratory-confirmed deaths, not estimates. For several reasons, these numbers do not give a true picture of mortality during the pandemic, which is unquestionably higher than indicated by laboratory-confirmed cases.

 

As pandemic influenza mimics the signs and symptoms of many common infectious diseases, doctors often do not suspect H1N1 infection and do not test. This is especially true in developing countries, where deaths from respiratory diseases, including pneumonia, are common occurrences. Moreover, routine testing for pandemic influenza is costly and demanding, and beyond the reach of most countries.

 

When testing confirms H1N1 infection in patients with underlying medical conditions, many doctors record these deaths as due to the medical condition, and not to the pandemic virus. These cases are also missed in official statistics.

 

As recent studies have shown, some tests for H1N1 infection are not entirely reliable, and false-negative results are a frequent problem. Accurate test results further depend on how and when samples were taken. Even in the best-equipped hospitals, doctors have reported seeing patients with distinctive and virtually identical disease profiles, yet only some have positive test results.

 

Moreover, in a large number of developing countries, systems for vital registration are either weak or non-existent, meaning that most deaths are neither investigated nor certified in terms of the cause.

Younger age groups

Comparisons of deaths from pandemic and seasonal influenza do not accurately measure the impact of the pandemic for another reason. Compared with seasonal influenza, the H1N1 virus affects a much younger age group in all categories – those most frequently infected, hospitalized, requiring intensive care, and dying.

 

WHO continues to assess the impact of the influenza pandemic as moderate. Accurate assessments of mortality and mortality rates will likely be possible only one to two years after the pandemic has peaked, and will rely on methods similar to those used to calculate excess mortality during seasonal influenza epidemics.

»» Read More

WHO Pandemic Update # 77

 

 

 

# 4120

 

Actually 3 reports for the price of 1.


The WHO Pandemic update # 77, their weekly virological surveillance update, and a lengthy report from SAGE (Strategic Advisory Group of Experts) on the 2009 H1N1 vaccine.


Follow the  links to read these reports.

 

 

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 77

Weekly update

4 December 2009 -- As of 29 November 2009, worldwide more than 207 countries and overseas territories or communities have reported laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic influenza H1N1 2009, including at least 8768 deaths.

 

As many countries have stopped counting individual cases, particularly of milder illness, the case count is likely to be significantly lower than the actual number of cases that have occurred. WHO is actively monitoring the progress of the pandemic through frequent consultations with the WHO Regional Offices and member states and through monitoring of multiple sources of data.

(Continue. . .)

 

 

 

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 77

Weekly update (more data on virological surveillance)

4 December 2009 -- Since the beginning of the pandemic in 19 April 2009 to 21 November, a total of 82 countries reported to FluNet. The total number of specimens reportedly positive for influenza viruses by NIC laboratories was 309,204. Of these, 220,641 (71.4%) were pandemic H1N1, 8130 (2.6%) were seasonal A (H1), 23,531 (7.6%) were A (H3), 51,071 (16.5%) were A (Not subtyped) and 5831 (1.9%) were influenza B.

 

For this reporting week (15 November to 21 November 2009); a total of 22 countries reported to FluNet. The total number of specimens reportedly positive for influenza viruses by NIC laboratories was 10,364. Of these, 9643 (93%) were pandemic H1N1, 104 (1%) were seasonal A (H1), 88 (0.8%) were A (H3), 467 (4.5%) were A (Not subtyped), 62 (0.6%) were influenza B. The above numbers represent only the specimens and results reported to FluNet. Some laboratories (NICs), under pressure of the pandemic surge, do not test for seasonal subtypes and accordingly, this data should be interpreted with caution.

 

Detailed virological information for the European Region of WHO is included in the EuroFlu Weekly Electronic Bulletin.

 

From the start of H1N1 pandemic (19 April) till 28th November 2009, cumulatively 150 countries shared a total of 19284 specimens (14879 clinical samples and 4405 virus isolates) with WHO CCs for confirmatory diagnosis and further characterization.

 

A mutation of D222G in the amino acid sequence of the haemagglutinin protein of the pandemic virus is being monitored by GISN. In addition to Norway, the mutation has also been observed in Brazil, China, Chinese Taipei, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Spain, , Ukraine, and USA, in both severe and mild cases.

 

Systematic surveillance conducted by GISN laboratories continues to detect incidents of H1N1 pandemic viruses that show resistance to the antiviral oseltamivir. Antiviral susceptibility testing has been carried out on pandemic H1N1 specimens and isolates from at least 31 countries. 96 cases of oseltamivir resistant pandemic H1N1 have been reported from GISN so far. All of these viruses show the same H275Y mutation, but remain sensitive to zanamivir.

 

 

Pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus vaccine – conclusions and recommendations from the October 2009 meeting of the immunization Strategic Advisory Group of Experts

(EXCERPT)

 

The vast majority of influenza viruses identified worldwide are now pandemic (H1N1) 2009. So far, the virus has been antigenically stable and susceptible to oseltamivir and zanamivir. A limited number of viruses with resistance to oseltamivir have been reported from sporadic cases. SAGE remains aware that evolution of the virus (genetically and antigenically) is unpredictable, especially as the levels of background immunity to this virus build, bringing increased evolutionary pressures on the virus.

 

Mathematical modelling conducted on southern hemisphere data suggests a 20–40% infection attack rate, with a reproductive rate in the range of 1.1–1.5. The generation time and incubation period appear comparable with those of seasonal influenza. Modelling on vaccination strategies indicates that if vaccination occurs after the peak period of transmission (which may be the case in many northern hemisphere countries), immunization of groups at risk for severe outcomes will be more effective in reducing morbidity and mortality than immunization of groups most associated with transmission of infection.

»» Read More

WHO Responds To Conflict Of Interest Allegations

 

Personal Note:  My blogging schedule will remain light, as the family medical crisis I mentioned two days ago drags on.  My apologies to  my readers.

 

Please check with Crof at Crofsblog for more timely news updates and Revere at Effect Measure and Vincent Racaniello at Virology Blog  for some of the best science analysis. You’ll find other reliable sources for information in my sidebar.

 

 


# 4015

 

Over the past few days allegations of impropriety and conflict of interest have arisen regarding the WHO (World Health Organization) and their use of advisors, some reportedly being paid by pharmaceutical companies.


An example of some of the coverage can be found in the PharmaTimes. 

 

 

Swine flu labelled a conspiracy


02 December 2009


The swine flu pandemic has been named as the “most ambitious scam and corruption of our time” after pharma has been found to be in bed with the World Health Organisation.

 

Journalists from Denmark have reported links between the World Health Organisation and pharmaceutical companies where firms have been covertly paying top WHO scientists. In the meantime, pharma profits from flu drugs have soared.

 

The journalists from the newspaper Information claim the public and political hysteria to swine flu is a result of an efficient public relations campaign, spearheaded by the WHO experts that have been prejudiced by pharma’s ready cash.

(Continue . . . )

 

The WHO has responded today with a lengthy briefing note outlining the steps they’ve taken to prevent conflicts of interest.   Admittedly, this statement may do little to dissuade the critics of the WHO and big Pharmaceutical interests. 

 

 

WHO use of advisory bodies in responding to the influenza pandemic

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 19

 

3 DECEMBER 2009 | GENEVA -- WHO is aware of some concerns, expressed in the media, that ties with the pharmaceutical industry among experts on the Organization’s advisory bodies may influence policy decisions, especially those relating to the influenza pandemic.

 

WHO has historically collaborated with the pharmaceutical industry for legitimate reasons. Efforts to improve health depend on better access to high-quality and affordable medicines, vaccines, and diagnostics. Medical interventions, including antiviral drugs, vaccines, and diagnostic tests, have long been recognized for their role in mitigating the health impact of an influenza pandemic. Pharmaceutical companies play an essential role in this regard and WHO has engaged with them to pursue its public health objectives.

 

Conflicts of interest: safeguards in place

Potential conflicts of interest are inherent in any relationship between a normative and health development agency, like WHO, and a profit-driven industry. Similar considerations apply when experts advising the Organization have professional links with pharmaceutical companies. Numerous safeguards are in place to manage possible conflicts of interest or their perception.

 

External experts who advise WHO are required to provide a declaration of interests that details professional or financial interests that could compromise the impartiality of their advice. Procedures are in place for identifying, investigating and assessing potential conflicts of interest, disclosing them, and taking appropriate action such as excluding an expert from participating in a meeting.

International Health Regulations

The influenza pandemic is providing the first major test of the revised International Health Regulations, which were approved by WHO Member States in 2005 and came into legal force in 2007. The Regulations provide an orderly, rules-based mechanism for coordinating the response to public health emergencies of international concern, such as that caused by the H1N1 pandemic virus.

 

Apart from protecting public health against the international spread of disease, the Regulations contain provisions for avoiding unnecessary interference with international travel and trade.

 

Under the provisions of the revised Regulations, an Emergency Committee advises the WHO Director-General on matters such as declaring a public health emergency of international concern, the need to raise the level of pandemic alert following spread of the H1N1 virus, and the need to introduce temporary measures, such as restrictions on travel or trade. Final decisions are made by the Director-General, as guided by the Committee’s advice.

 

All members of the Emergency Committee sign a confidentiality agreement, provide a declaration of interests, and agree to give their consultative time freely, without compensation. Members of the Committee are drawn from a roster of about 160 experts covering a range of public health areas. The framework for membership is set out in the International Health Regulations. Each State Party to the Regulations is entitled to nominate one member of the roster and additional experts are appointed by the Director-General. Recommendations of the Emergency Committee are immediately made public on the WHO web site together with the relevant decisions of the Director-General.

 

Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization

 

In responding to the pandemic, WHO has also drawn on advice from a standing body of experts, the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE), which advises WHO on vaccine use. Members of SAGE are likewise required to declare all professional and financial interests, including funding received from pharmaceutical companies or consultancies or other forms of professional engagement with pharmaceutical companies. The names and affiliations of members of SAGE and of SAGE working groups are published on the WHO web site, together with meeting reports and declarations of interest submitted by the experts.

 

Allegations of undeclared conflicts of interest are taken very seriously by WHO, and are immediately investigated.

 

 

Criticisms: understandable but unfounded

 

Public perceptions about the current H1N1 influenza pandemic, as well as national preparedness plans, were strongly influenced by a five-year close watch over the highly lethal H5N1 avian influenza virus, which was widely regarded as the virus most likely to ignite the next influenza pandemic. A pandemic caused by a virus that kills more than 60% of the people it infects is strikingly, and fortunately, very different from the reality of the current pandemic.

 

Adjusting public perceptions to suit a far less lethal virus has been problematic. Given the discrepancy between what was expected and what has happened, a search for ulterior motives on the part of WHO and its scientific advisers is understandable, though without justification.

 

WHO has consistently assessed the impact of the current influenza pandemic as moderate. WHO has consistently reminded the medical community, public, and media that the overwhelming majority of patients experience mild influenza-like illness and recover fully within a week, even without any form of medical treatment. WHO has consistently advised against any restrictions on travel or trade. Although influenza viruses are notoriously unpredictable, it is hoped that this moderate impact will continue throughout the duration of the pandemic.

 

 

 

 

»» Read More

WHO Briefing Statement On Tamiflu Resistant Viruses

 


# 4013

 

Lisa Schnirring of CIDRAP News tonight has an excellent overview of a briefing statement and a press conference held today by the WHO (World Health Organization) regarding Tamiflu resistant viruses and the need to `tweak’ treatment regimens for immunocompromised patients.

 

I’ve got the opening to Lisa’s overview, followed by the briefing note posted on the WHO site.

 

WHO: Resistant flu clusters warrant greater vigilance, treatment tweaks

Lisa Schnirring * Staff Writer

Dec 2, 2009 (CIDRAP News) – The World Health Organization (WHO) said today that oseltamivir (Tamiflu)-resistant pandemic H1N1 cases in hospital settings suggest that treatment doses may need to be increased in immunocompromised patients who have flu symptoms.

 

The agency made this statement after a teleconference with experts about two recent clusters of resistant cases. It also concluded that the events don't signal a public health threat.

 

The WHO, in a statement, said emergence of drug-resistant flu in severely immunosuppressed or immunocompromised patients is expected and has been well documented in seasonal flu.

 

In late October a Welsh hospital detected an outbreak of oseltamivir-resistant pandemic H1N1 in eight patients who had severe hematologic disorders. Edwina Hart, health minister for the Welsh Assembly Government, said today in a statement that three of the patients appear to have been infected in the hospital.

 

Three are still hospitalized, one in critical care. All are responding to treatment with a different antiviral, she said.

 

Hart said so far there is no evidence that the resistant strain spread outside the hospital and that it does not appear to be any more severe than nonresistant strains.

(Continue . . . )

 

You’ll find more details on the North Carolina cases at Duke Hospital Reports No Further Spread Of Resistant Strain.

 

This is the WHO briefing note.  It is rather lengthy, so I’ve not posted the entire thing.

 

Follow the links to read it in its entirety.

 

 

Oseltamivir resistance in immunocompromised hospital patients

 

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 18

 

2 DECEMBER 2009 | GENEVA -- WHO has been informed of two recent clusters of patients infected with oseltamivir-resistant H1N1 viruses. Both clusters, detected in Wales, UK and North Carolina, USA, occurred in a single ward in a hospital, and both involved patients whose immune systems were severely compromised or suppressed. Transmission of resistant virus from one patient to another is suspected in both outbreaks.

 

The emergence of drug-resistant influenza viruses in severely immunosuppressed or immunocompromised patients undergoing antiviral treatment is not unexpected and has been well documented during seasonal influenza. Virus replication can persist in such patients for prolonged periods of time despite antiviral treatment, creating an environment in which drug-resistant viruses can readily be selected. This phenomenon has also been observed for the pandemic (H1N1) 2009.

 

Upon receipt of the reports, WHO organized a telephone conference with officials and staff from the hospitals and experts in clinical medicine, epidemiology, and virology to discuss the two outbreaks. Particular attention is being given to the best treatment options for immunocompromised patients who become infected with the pandemic virus.

(Continue . . . )

»» Read More

WHO Pandemic Briefing #15: Farmed Animals And H1N1

 


# 3959

 


The World Health Organization has released their 15th Pandemic Briefing note, this time dealing with the hot subject of the H1N1 virus beginning to show up in farm animals, such as turkeys and pigs.

 

This has been a frequent topic of conversation in this, an many other flu blogs, with my latest blog about this coming earlier today.

 

 

 

Infection of farmed animals with the pandemic virus

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 15

5 NOVEMBER 2009 | GENEVA -- To date, extensive testing by laboratories in the WHO influenza surveillance network has detected no signs that the H1N1 pandemic virus has mutated to a more virulent form. Currently licensed pandemic vaccines closely match circulating viruses and are expected to confer good protection.

 

Vigilance for changes in the H1N1 virus includes monitoring to detect possible influenza infections in susceptible animals, both mammals and birds, as well as humans. While most influenza A viruses circulating in mammals preferentially infect a single species, cross-species transmission is known to occur.

Infections in swine

Concern has traditionally focused on swine, which are susceptible to infections from human and avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses. As influenza viruses have eight neatly segmented genes, swine could theoretically operate as a viral “mixing vessel” for the exchange of genetic material when an animal is co-infected with different viruses. Such an event could lead to changes in the genetic makeup of the H1N1 virus or result in a novel influenza virus of unknown public health significance.

 

Since the new H1N1 pandemic virus emerged, a small number of infections in swine herds have been reported. Limited evidence suggests that these infections occurred following direct transmission of the virus from infected humans to swine. These isolated events have had no impact on the dynamics of the pandemic, which is spreading readily via human-to-human transmission. As human infections become increasingly widespread, transmission of the virus from humans to swine is likely to occur with greater frequency.

Influenza in other species

In addition, pandemic H1N1 infections have been reported in turkeys in Chile and Canada and in a few pet animals in the USA. Again, these infections were isolated events and pose no special risks to human health.

 

The virus is killed at normal cooking temperatures. No human infections have been linked to the consumption of properly prepared meat or animal products, or any other food items.

 

Another concern is the continuing presence of the highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus in poultry in several countries, where the virus is endemic. While no one can predict how the H5N1 virus might behave under the pressures of a pandemic, all data to date have been reassuring.

 

Most recently, authorities in Denmark reported a novel H3N2 influenza virus in mink on several mink farms. Sequencing of the virus demonstrated a combination of human and swine genes that has not been identified previously in circulating influenza viruses. Testing of farm workers detected no spread of the virus to humans. However, the incident demonstrates the constantly evolving ecology of influenza viruses, the potential for surprising changes, and the need for constant vigilance, also in animals.

Close monitoring needed

These recent findings further suggest that influenza A viruses in animals and humans increasingly behave like a pool of genes circulating among multiple hosts, and that the potential exists for novel influenza viruses to be generated in animals other than swine. This situation reinforces the need for close monitoring and close collaboration between public health and veterinary authorities.

 

When influenza infections are detected in farmed animals, WHO recommends monitoring of farm workers for signs of respiratory illness, and testing for H1N1 infection should such signs appear. FAO and OIE recommend that animals that are showing signs of illness be examined and properly managed, and allowed to fully recover before being transported or marketed.

 

In addition, samples from infected animals and humans should be taken for full genome sequencing of the influenza viruses to determine if mutations have occurred that could lead to changes in virulence, host range or antiviral resistance. Such sequencing is also important to assess the possible origin of the case or outbreak.

Official notification

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus infections in birds must be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), as must any "emerging disease" in animals. This would include infections with the pandemic H1N1 virus or other novel influenza viruses, when consistent with the “emerging disease” criteria for official notification.

 

These animal health events should be reported, together with the results of epidemiological and virological investigations, in keeping with OIE requirements for notification.

RELATED LINKS

Evolution of pandemic H1N1 2009 in animals
Press release from the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)


Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO): Pandemic (H1N1) 2009

»» Read More

WHO Briefing Note # 14: Vaccine Policies And Strategies

 

 

# 3909

 

 

The WHO (World Health Organization) announced this week that they would be making 200 million doses of donated vaccine available to 100 developing nations over the coming months.  

 

Today, in their 14th Pandemic Briefing note, they provide expert guidance on the use of vaccine.


You can find all 14 briefing notes HERE.

 

 

 

 

Experts advise WHO on pandemic vaccine policies and strategies

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 14

30 OCTOBER 2009 | GENEVA -- The Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Immunization, which advises WHO on policies and strategies for vaccines and immunization, devoted a session of its 27–29 October meeting to pandemic influenza vaccines. The experts reviewed the current epidemiological situation of the pandemic worldwide and considered issues and options from a public health perspective.

 

Items on the agenda included the status of vaccine availability, results from clinical trials on vaccine immunogenicity, and early results from safety monitoring in countries where administration of the H1N1 pandemic vaccine is currently under way.

 

The experts also advised WHO on the number of doses of vaccine needed to confer protection, also in different age groups, the co-administration of seasonal and pandemic vaccines, and vaccines for use in pregnant women. Recommendations on the formulation of seasonal influenza vaccines for the southern hemisphere in 2010 were also provided.

 

Current situation

 

Globally, teenagers and young adults continue to account for the majority of cases, with rates of hospitalization highest in very young children. Between 1% to 10% of patients with clinical illness require hospitalization. Of hospitalized patients, from 10% to 25% require admission to an intensive care unit, and from 2% to 9% have a fatal outcome.

 

Overall, from 7% to 10% of all hospitalized patients are pregnant women in their second or third trimester of pregnancy. Pregnant women are ten times more likely to need care in an intensive care unit when compared with the general population.

 

Based on these and other current findings, the experts made a number of recommendations.

 

Single dose recommended

 

The experts noted that a variety of pandemic vaccines, including live attenuated and both adjuvanted and non-adjuvanted inactivated vaccines, have now been licensed for use by regulatory authorities. SAGE recommended the use of a single dose of vaccine in adults and adolescents, beginning at the age of 10 years, provided such use is consistent with indications from regulatory authorities.

 

Data on immunogenicity in children older than 6 months and younger than 10 years are limited and more studies are needed. Where national authorities have made children a priority for early vaccination, SAGE recommended that priority be given to the administration of one dose of vaccine to as many children as possible. SAGE further stressed the need for studies to determine dosage regimens effective in immunocompromised persons.

 

Co-administration of vaccines

 

Clinical trials investigating the co-administration of seasonal and pandemic vaccines are ongoing, but SAGE acknowledged the recommendation, from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, that live attenuated seasonal and live attenuated pandemic vaccines should not be co-administered.

 

The experts recommended that seasonal and pandemic vaccines can be administered simultaneously, provided both vaccines are inactivated, or one is inactivated and the other is live attenuated. The experts found no evidence that co-administration of vaccines, as recommended, would increase the risk of adverse events.

 

Vaccine safety

 

The experts reviewed early results from the monitoring of people who have received pandemic vaccines and found no indication of unusual adverse reactions. Some adverse events following vaccination have been notified, but these are well within the range of those seen with seasonal vaccines, which have an excellent safety profile. Although early results are reassuring, monitoring for adverse events should continue.

 

Vaccines for pregnant women

 

Concerning vaccines for pregnant women, SAGE noted that studies in experimental animals using live attenuated vaccines and non-adjuvanted or adjuvanted inactivated vaccines found no evidence of direct or indirect harmful effects on fertility, pregnancy, development of the embryo or fetus, birthing, or post-natal development.

 

Based on these data and the substantially elevated risk for a severe outcome in pregnant women infected with the pandemic virus, SAGE recommended that any licensed vaccine can be used in pregnant women, provided no specific contraindication has been identified by the regulatory authority.

 

Vaccines for the southern hemisphere in 2010

 

SAGE also considered vaccines for use in the southern hemisphere during the 2010 winter season. Two options were assessed: a trivalent vaccine, effective against the H1N1 pandemic virus, the seasonal H3N2 virus, and influenza B viruses, and a bivalent seasonal vaccine, effective against H3N2 and influenza B viruses, which might need to be supplemented with a separate monovalent H1N1 pandemic vaccine.

 

The experts concluded that both options should remain available for vaccine formulations in the southern hemisphere, subject to national needs.

»» Read More

CIDRAP News & Overview Of CDC Briefing

 


# 3820

 

 

Maryn McKenna, who pens the Superbug Blog, is also a contributing writer for CIDRAP News.

 

Tonight Maryn gives us an excellent overview of today’s CDC briefing by Dr. Anne Schuchat, Director of of the CDC's National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases and by Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.

 

Follow the link to read the article in its entirety.

 

Pediatric H1N1 deaths already rival seasonal flu total

Maryn McKenna * Contributing Writer

Oct 9, 2009 (CIDRAP News) – Seventy-six children and teenagers have died of H1N1 flu since the novel strain emerged in April, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) said today, representing both an increase of 19 in a week and a total that rivals the child deaths for entire past flu seasons.

And with the pandemic strain becoming establishing across the country, widespread in 37 states compared with 27 last week, deaths and case counts are expected to rise.

 

"In the past 3 years, the total pediatric influenza deaths ranged from 46 to 88," Dr. Anne Schuchat, director of the CDC's National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, said in a press briefing. "It is only the beginning of October. Of course, the flu season will often last all the way to May, and so it is very early for us to predict exactly what is going to happen."

(Continue . . . )

 

You’ll also find a roundup of Today’s Pandemic news on CIDRAP’s Novel H1N1 Page.

 

H1N1 Flu Breaking News


Pandemic flu still on rise in Northern Hemisphere

Lack of case counts blunts assessment of flu impact

UK H1N1 cases fewer than feared

Vaccine for public to trickle in to Minnesota

Hospital gives workers two choices: shot or mask

Most Canadians unconcerned about H1N1

»» Read More

WHO Briefing Note # 12: Antiviral Use

 

 

# 3767

 

While the pandemic surveillance numbers reported via the WHO (World Health Organization) often leave much to be desired, their series of briefing notes – released roughly once each week – usually contain some interesting and meaningful information.

 

This week we get a roundup of what we currently know about antiviral resistance in the novel H1N1 `swine’ flu virus.

 

To date, the number of lab confirmed resistant virus samples in this virus have been small (28), but the real number is suspected to be considerably higher.  Our testing and surveillance for this mutational change is spotty at best.

 

For now, it appears that the percentage of resistant cases remains quite low, and that Oseltamivir remains an effective treatment for the vast majority of H1N1 cases. 

 

 

Antiviral use and the risk of drug resistance

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 12

25 SEPTEMBER 2009 | GENEVA -- Growing international experience in the treatment of pandemic H1N1 virus infections underscores the importance of early treatment with the antiviral drugs, oseltamivir or zanamivir. Early treatment is especially important for patients who are at increased risk of developing complications, those who present with severe illness or those with worsening signs and symptoms.[1]

 

The experience of clinicians, including those who have treated severe cases of pandemic influenza, and national authorities suggests that prompt administration of these drugs following symptom onset reduces the risk of complications and can also improve clinical outcome in patients with severe disease.

 

This experience further underscores the need to protect the effectiveness of these drugs by minimizing the occurrence and impact of drug resistance.

 

High-risk situations for development of drug resistance

 

WHO encourages clinicians to be alert to two situations that carry a high risk for the emergence of viruses resistant to oseltamivir.

 

The risk of resistance is considered higher in patients with severely compromised or suppressed immune systems who have prolonged illness, have received oseltamivir treatment (especially for an extended duration), but still have evidence of persistent viral replication.

 

The risk of resistance is also considered higher in people who receive oseltamivir for so-called “post-exposure prophylaxis” following exposure to another person with influenza, and who then develop illness despite taking oseltamivir.

 

In both of these clinical situations, health care staff should respond with a high level of suspicion that oseltamivir resistance has developed. Laboratory investigation should be undertaken to determine whether resistant virus is present and appropriate infection control measures should be implemented or re-enforced to prevent spread of the resistant virus.

 

When a drug-resistant virus is detected, WHO further recommends that an epidemiological investigation be undertaken to determine whether onward transmission of the resistant virus has occurred. In addition, community surveillance for oseltamivir-resistant pandemic H1N1 virus strains should be enhanced.

 

In general, WHO does not recommend the use of antiviral drugs for prophylactic purposes. For people who have had exposure to an infected person and are at a higher risk of developing severe or complicated illness, an alternative option is close monitoring for symptoms, followed by prompt early antiviral treatment should symptoms develop.

 

WHO has also recommended against the use of a particular antiviral where the virus is known or highly likely to be resistant to it. For this reason, zanamivir is the treatment of choice for patients who become ill while on oseltamivir prophylaxis.

 

Oseltamivir-resistant viruses

Systematic surveillance conducted by the Global Influenza Surveillance Network, supported by WHO Collaborating Centres and other laboratories, continues to detect sporadic incidents of H1N1 pandemic viruses that show resistance to oseltamivir. To date, 28 resistant viruses have been detected and characterized worldwide.[2]

 

All of these viruses show the same H275Y mutation that confers resistance to the antiviral oseltamivir, but not to the antiviral zanamivir. Zanamivir remains a treatment option in symptomatic patients with severe or deteriorating illness due to oseltamivir-resistant virus.

 

Twelve of these drug-resistant viruses were associated with the use of oseltamivir for post-exposure prophylaxis. Six were associated with the use of oseltamivir treatment in patients with severe immunosuppression. Four were isolated from samples from patients receiving oseltamivir treatment.

 

A further two were isolated from patients who were not taking oseltamivir for either treatment or prophylaxis. Characterization of the remaining viruses is under way.

 

These numbers are comparatively small at present. Worldwide, more than 10,000 clinical specimens (samples and isolates) of the pandemic H1N1 virus have been tested and found to be sensitive to oseltamivir.

 

Current conclusions

 

These data support several conclusions. Cases of oseltamivir-resistant viruses continue to be sporadic and infrequent, with no evidence that oseltamivir-resistant pandemic H1N1 viruses are circulating within communities or worldwide.

 

To date, person-to-person transmission of these oseltamivir resistant viruses has not been conclusively demonstrated. In some situations, however, local transmission may have occurred, but without any further onward or ongoing transmission.

 

Except for immunocompromised patients, those infected with an oseltamivir-resistant pandemic H1N1 virus have experienced typical uncomplicated influenza symptoms. No evidence suggests that oseltamivir-resistant viruses are causing a different or more severe form of illness.

 

The occurrence of oseltamivir-resistant viruses is expected and is consistent with observations from early clinical trials. As use of antiviral drugs continues to grow, further reports of drug-resistance viruses are certain to occur. WHO and its network of collaborating laboratories are closely monitoring the situation and will issue information and advice on a regular basis as indicated.

_______________________

[1] Briefing Note on recommendations for use of antivirals
[2] Weekly updates on cases of oseltamivir resistant pandemic H1N1 virus

»» Read More

WHO Pandemic Briefing Note 10

 

 

# 3719

 

The World Health Organization has released their 10th Pandemic briefing note, this time addressing the plusses and minuses of school closings as a pandemic mitigation measure.

 

As I read these recommendations, I’m reminded of the old quote attributed to Harry Truman (because there are no new ones), where he said what he wished for most as President was “A one-armed economist . . . one who couldn’t say `But, on the other hand . . .”.

 

That, of course, is the problem with a pandemic.  There are no hard and fast rules, no certainties over what will work and what won’t, or what is best in the long run for individuals and families or for the larger community.  

 

Of course, sometimes those interests are at odds with each other. And what might be best in one locality might be disastrous in another. 

 

In other words, the WHO doesn’t make specific recommendations simply because there is no one-size-fits-all solution.

 

They do point out the benefits of proactive early school closings, and suggest that they may be useful, although their benefits must be weighed against the social costs.

 

My thanks and a hat tip to the indefatigable @Dutchy123 on Flutrackers for tweeting and posting this link.

 

 

 

Measures in school settings

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 10

11 SEPTEMBER 2009 | GENEVA -- WHO is today issuing advice on measures that can be undertaken in schools to reduce the impact of the H1N1 influenza pandemic. Recommendations draw on recent experiences in several countries as well as studies of the health, economic, and social consequences of school closures. These studies were undertaken by members of a WHO informal network for mathematical modelling of the pandemic.

 

Experience to date has demonstrated the role of schools in amplifying transmission of the pandemic virus, both within schools and into the wider community. While outbreaks in schools are clearly an important dimension of the current pandemic, no single measure can stop or limit transmission in schools, which provide multiple opportunities for spread of the virus.

 

WHO recommends the use of a range of measures that can be adapted to the local epidemiological situation, available resources, and the social role played by many schools. National and local authorities are in the best position to make decisions about these measures and how they should be adapted and implemented.

 

WHO continues to recommend that students, teachers, and other staff who feel unwell should stay home. Plans should be in place, and space made available, to isolate students and staff who become ill while at school.

 

Schools should promote hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette and be stocked with appropriate supplies. Proper cleaning and ventilation and measures to reduce crowding are also advised.

 

School closures and class suspensions

 

Decisions about if and when schools should be closed during the pandemic are complex and highly context-specific. WHO cannot provide specific recommendations for or against school closure that are applicable to all settings. However, some general guidance comes from recent experience in several countries in both the northern and southern hemispheres, mathematical modelling, and experience during seasonal epidemics of influenza.

 

School closure can operate as a proactive measure, aimed at reducing transmission in the school and spread into the wider community. School closure can also be a reactive measure, when schools close or classes are suspended because high levels of absenteeism among students and staff make it impractical to continue classes.

 

The main health benefit of proactive school closure comes from slowing down the spread of an outbreak within a given area and thus flattening the peak of infections. This benefit becomes especially important when the number of people requiring medical care at the peak of the pandemic threatens to saturate or overwhelm health care capacity. By slowing the speed of spread, school closure can also buy some time as countries intensify preparedness measures or build up supplies of vaccines, antiviral drugs, and other interventions.

 

The timing of school closure is critically important. Modelling studies suggest that school closure has its greatest benefits when schools are closed very early in an outbreak, ideally before 1% of the population falls ill. Under ideal conditions, school closure can reduce the demand for health care by an estimated 30–50% at the peak of the pandemic. However, if schools close too late in the course of a community-wide outbreak, the resulting reduction in transmission is likely to be very limited.

 

Policies for school closure need to include measures that limit contact among students when not in school. If students congregate in a setting other than a school, they will continue to spread the virus, and the benefits of school closure will be greatly reduced, if not negated.

 

Economic and social costs

 

When making decisions, health officials and school authorities need to be aware of economic and social costs that can be disproportionately high when viewed against these potential benefits.

 

The main economic cost arises from absenteeism of working parents or guardians who have to stay home to take care of their children. Studies estimate that school closures can lead to the absence of 16% of the workforce, in addition to normal levels of absenteeism and absenteeism due to illness. Such estimates will, however, vary considerably across countries depending on several factors, including the structure of the workforce.

 

Paradoxically, while school closure can reduce the peak demand on health care systems, it can also disrupt the provision of essential health care, as many doctors and nurses are parents of school-age children.

 

Decisions also need to consider social welfare issues. Children’s health and well-being can be compromised if highly beneficial school-based social programmes, such as the provision of meals, are interrupted or if young children are left at home without supervision.

»» Read More

WHO Briefing Note #9 & Weekly Update

 


# 3679

 

The World Health Organization (WHO) has moved from reporting twice a day on the novel H1N1 influenza pandemic, to once-a-week updates, and `briefing notes’ roughly every week or so.

 

Given the vagaries of reporting of cases and fatalities from around the world, that makes sense. 

 

The numbers from the WHO have never really accurately portrayed the spread and impact of the virus, and the deeper into this pandemic we get, the less these numbers represent the true picture.

 

Still there is useful information to be gleaned from these weekly updates.  

 

 

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - update 63

Weekly update

In the southern hemisphere, most countries (represented by Chile, Argentina, New Zealand, and Australia) appear to have passed their peak of influenza activity and have either returned to baseline levels or are experiencing focal activity in later affect areas; while a few others (represented by South Africa and Bolivia) continue to experience high levels of influenza activity.

 

Many countries in tropical regions (represented by Central America and tropical regions of Asia), continue to see increasing or sustained high levels of influenza activity with some countries reporting moderate strains on the healthcare system. In temperate areas of the northern hemisphere (represented by North America, Europe, and Central Asia), influenza and respiratory disease activity remains low overall, with some countries experiencing localized outbreaks. In Japan, the level of influenza activity has passed the seasonal epidemic threshold, signaling a very early beginning to the annual influenza season.

(Continue . . . )

 

image

 

 

Of greater value, perhaps, are the briefings which offer us overviews on a variety of pandemic related subjects.  Today’s – on lessons learned from the first wave - is particularly interesting.

 

 

Preparing for the second wave: lessons from current outbreaks

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 9

28 AUGUST 2009 | GENEVA -- Monitoring of outbreaks from different parts of the world provides sufficient information to make some tentative conclusions about how the influenza pandemic might evolve in the coming months.

 

WHO is advising countries in the northern hemisphere to prepare for a second wave of pandemic spread. Countries with tropical climates, where the pandemic virus arrived later than elsewhere, also need to prepare for an increasing number of cases.

 

Countries in temperate parts of the southern hemisphere should remain vigilant. As experience has shown, localized “hot spots” of increasing transmission can continue to occur even when the pandemic has peaked at the national level.

 

H1N1 now the dominant virus strain

Evidence from multiple outbreak sites demonstrates that the H1N1 pandemic virus has rapidly established itself and is now the dominant influenza strain in most parts of the world. The pandemic will persist in the coming months as the virus continues to move through susceptible populations.

 

Close monitoring of viruses by a WHO network of laboratories shows that viruses from all outbreaks remain virtually identical. Studies have detected no signs that the virus has mutated to a more virulent or lethal form.

 

Likewise, the clinical picture of pandemic influenza is largely consistent across all countries. The overwhelming majority of patients continue to experience mild illness. Although the virus can cause very severe and fatal illness, also in young and healthy people, the number of such cases remains small.

Large populations susceptible to infection

While these trends are encouraging, large numbers of people in all countries remain susceptible to infection. Even if the current pattern of usually mild illness continues, the impact of the pandemic during the second wave could worsen as larger numbers of people become infected.

 

Larger numbers of severely ill patients requiring intensive care are likely to be the most urgent burden on health services, creating pressures that could overwhelm intensive care units and possibly disrupt the provision of care for other diseases.

Monitoring for drug resistance

At present, only a handful of pandemic viruses resistant to oseltamivir have been detected worldwide, despite the administration of many millions of treatment courses of antiviral drugs. All of these cases have been extensively investigated, and no instances of onward transmission of drug-resistant virus have been documented to date. Intense monitoring continues, also through the WHO network of laboratories.

Not the same as seasonal influenza

Current evidence points to some important differences between patterns of illness reported during the pandemic and those seen during seasonal epidemics of influenza.

 

The age groups affected by the pandemic are generally younger. This is true for those most frequently infected, and especially so for those experiencing severe or fatal illness.

 

To date, most severe cases and deaths have occurred in adults under the age of 50 years, with deaths in the elderly comparatively rare. This age distribution is in stark contrast with seasonal influenza, where around 90% of severe and fatal cases occur in people 65 years of age or older.

Severe respiratory failure

Perhaps most significantly, clinicians from around the world are reporting a very severe form of disease, also in young and otherwise healthy people, which is rarely seen during seasonal influenza infections. In these patients, the virus directly infects the lung, causing severe respiratory failure. Saving these lives depends on highly specialized and demanding care in intensive care units, usually with long and costly stays.

During the winter season in the southern hemisphere, several countries have viewed the need for intensive care as the greatest burden on health services. Some cities in these countries report that nearly 15 percent of hospitalized cases have required intensive care.

Preparedness measures need to anticipate this increased demand on intensive care units, which could be overwhelmed by a sudden surge in the number of severe cases.

Vulnerable groups

An increased risk during pregnancy is now consistently well-documented across countries. This risk takes on added significance for a virus, like this one, that preferentially infects younger people.

 

Data continue to show that certain medical conditions increase the risk of severe and fatal illness. These include respiratory disease, notably asthma, cardiovascular disease, diabetes and immunosuppression.

 

When anticipating the impact of the pandemic as more people become infected, health officials need to be aware that many of these predisposing conditions have become much more widespread in recent decades, thus increasing the pool of vulnerable people.

 

Obesity, which is frequently present in severe and fatal cases, is now a global epidemic. WHO estimates that, worldwide, more than 230 million people suffer from asthma, and more than 220 million people have diabetes.

 

Moreover, conditions such as asthma and diabetes are not usually considered killer diseases, especially in children and young adults. Young deaths from such conditions, precipitated by infection with the H1N1 virus, can be another dimension of the pandemic’s impact.

Higher risk of hospitalization and death

Several early studies show a higher risk of hospitalization and death among certain subgroups, including minority groups and indigenous populations. In some studies, the risk in these groups is four to five times higher than in the general population.

Although the reasons are not fully understood, possible explanations include lower standards of living and poor overall health status, including a high prevalence of conditions such as asthma, diabetes and hypertension.

Implications for the developing world

Such findings are likely to have growing relevance as the pandemic gains ground in the developing world, where many millions of people live under deprived conditions and have multiple health problems, with little access to basic health care.

 

As much current data about the pandemic come from wealthy and middle-income countries, the situation in developing countries will need to be very closely watched. The same virus that causes manageable disruption in affluent countries could have a devastating impact in many parts of the developing world.

Co-infection with HIV

The 2009 influenza pandemic is the first to occur since the emergence of HIV/AIDS. Early data from two countries suggest that people co-infected with H1N1 and HIV are not at increased risk of severe or fatal illness, provided these patients are receiving antiretroviral therapy. In most of these patients, illness caused by H1N1 has been mild, with full recovery.

 

If these preliminary findings are confirmed, this will be reassuring news for countries where infection with HIV is prevalent and treatment coverage with antiretroviral drugs is good.

 

On current estimates, around 33 million people are living with HIV/AIDS worldwide. Of these, WHO estimates that around 4 million were receiving antiretroviral therapy at the end of 2008.

»» Read More