Showing posts with label Pandemic. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pandemic. Show all posts

EID Book Review - Spillover: Animal Infections and the Next Human Pandemic

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Link to book on Amazon (excerpts available online)

 


# 6834

 

In 2012, award winning author and Rhodes Scholar David Quammen published his 10th book on science, titled  Spillover: Animal Infections and the Next Human Pandemic. Quammen, whose first book was published in 1970, also has five books of fiction, along with many magazine articles in his resume.

 

Today, the CDC’s EID Journal has a short, but very complementary review of his book, Spillover.  I’d be remiss if I didn’t mention that reviews on Amazon have been superlative as well, and Spillover has made more than one Top 10 books of 2012 lists. 

 

First the EID review, then I’ll return with more.

Books and Media

Spillover: Animal Infection and the Next Human Pandemic

Article Contents

David Quammen
W.W. Norton & Company, Ltd., New York, New York, USA, 2012
ISBN: 978-0-393-06680-7
Pages: 487; Price: US $28.95

Spillover is a single event during which a pathogen from 1 species moves into another species; such movement can result in an outbreak. In 9 chapters, David Quammen chronicles various spillover events by using personal anecdotes and multiple stories to recount these events for the expert and novice alike. He frames the events within an ecologic sense of the pathogen, the host, and the increasing human population. He focuses recurrently on the NBO (next big one) and how, if HIV or Ebola virus were more easily transmissible, no one would remain to read his book.

 

Quammen’s analogies are superb. Instead of trying to turn the reader into a scientist with dry explanations, he uses analogies that have universal relevance. For viral morphology, Ebola and Hendra virions together would resemble a “capellini in a light sauce of capers.” Mathematical modeling can be appreciated in translation, just as Dostoevsky can be appreciated in translation instead of in the original Russian. Quammen compares combining specific antibodies with their virus to splashing holy water on a witch. Regarding airborne transmission, he says that pathogens can “waft into a nearby village as easily as the pleasant, autumnal smell of smoke from a pile of leaves.” Throughout the book, the subjects of human and animal diseases are “. . . strands of one braided cord.”

 

The last chapter, “It Depends,” is particularly sobering. If, in an ecologic sense, an outbreak is a rapid and explosive increase in the abundance of a particular species, then maybe humans are the current outbreak in the world. We have become a dense forest; tinder is dry; and the NBO is around the corner.

 

Who should read this book? Anyone interested in science can enjoy it—those who make their living at the bench, teach, or study—and anyone just looking for a good read.

Corrie BrownComments to Author

Author affiliation: Author affiliation: University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, USA

 

 

Spillover also received a glowing endorsement from Ed Yong when he was at Discover Magazine (see Spillover, by David Quammen – a recommended read), and I can wholeheartedly recommend it myself.

 

For more on David’s book, and the threats posed by zoonotic disease spillovers, we turn to a Minnesota NPR radio interview recorded last September. It runs 30 minutes, and is well worth the time.

 

 

David Quammen on 'Spillover,' the next worldwide pandemic

11:20 AM, September 24, 2012

»» Read More

Study: Self-Administered Vaccines In Adults

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LAIV nasal syringe – Credit CDC PHIL 

 

# 6811

 

Beyond the difficulties of producing billions of doses of an emergency pandemic influenza vaccine, one of the logistical nightmares is how to best deploy them. The standard solutions – where vaccination centers are set up in public venues, pharmacies, and clinics – have some serious downsides.

 

Queuing hundreds of people together for hours during a pandemic is a good way to spread a virus further. And there are likely to be crowd control and security issues in some places as well.

 

During the 1976 Swine flu scare (see Deja Flu, All Over Again), I was one of thousands of health care workers around the country who were dragooned into providing pandemic flu shots. The logistics of vaccinating millions of people – even without a pandemic raging – were daunting.

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Yes, that’s me in 1976. I and swear to this very day, that lady was making that face before I gave her the shot.

 

One solution –  made possible by the development of an  LAIV (Live attenuated Influenza Vaccine) – would be to have people self inoculate themselves at home. 

 

LAIV vaccines – unlike the standard flu shot - are delivered via a nasal spray, not a needle.

 

The CDC describes the major differences between the TIV (Trivalent Influenza Vaccine) shot, and the LAIV nasal spray as follows:

 

Major Differences Between TIV and LAIV

Influenza Prevention and Control Recommendations

Published for the 2010-11 Influenza Season; Adapted for the 2012-13 Influenza Season

Trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine (TIV) contains inactivated viruses and thus cannot cause influenza. Live-attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) contains live attenuated influenza viruses that have the potential to cause mild signs or symptoms related to vaccine virus infection (e.g., rhinorrhea, nasal congestion, fever, or sore throat). LAIV is administered intranasally by sprayer, whereas TIV is administered intramuscularly or intradermally by injection.

LAIV is licensed for use among nonpregnant persons aged 2-49 years; safety has not been established in persons with underlying medical conditions that confer a higher risk for influenza complications. TIV is licensed for use among persons 6 months and older, including those who are healthy and those with chronic medical conditions.

 

While not suitable for everyone, LAIVs could be used to inoculate a large segment of the population during an influenza pandemic, without the need of a Health care worker. 

 

All of which brings us to a study, recently published in the journal Vaccine (abstract slightly reparagraphed for readability), which looks at:

 

 

The safety and effectiveness of self-administration of intranasal live attenuated influenza vaccine in adults.

 

Ambrose CS, Wu X.

 

Vaccine. 2012 Dec 19. pii: S0264-410X(12)01798-7. doi: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2012.12.028.

Source

MedImmune, LLC, Gaithersburg, MD, USA. Electronic address: ambrosec@medimmune.com.

Abstract

Intranasal live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) has potential for self-administration (SA) by adults and adolescents, which could save time and cost in mass vaccination settings. Participants in a study of LAIV in adults (n=4561) selected either SA or health care provider (HCP) administration and were followed for febrile illness during the influenza season.

More LAIV recipients chose SA-LAIV (72%) than HCP-LAIV (28%). Overall, 97% of SA-LAIV and 98% of HCP-LAIV recipients had no problems with vaccine administration. Four of 13 study sites enrolled more than 50 subjects in both cohorts. Overall and for these 4 sites, illness incidence was similar with SA-LAIV and HCP-LAIV.

Solicited reactogenicity events and adverse events through 7 days post vaccination were comparable for SA-LAIV and HCP-LAIV recipients; both groups exhibited increased runny nose, sore throat, and cough relative to placebo recipients. SA-LAIV and HCP-LAIV appeared similarly effective against influenza-like illness and had comparable safety profiles.

 

CIDRAP NEWS  summarized these findings last week in their Flu News Scan.

 

Study: Smooth sailing for self-administered LAIV flu vax


Self-administered intranasal live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) is as safe and effective as that administered by health providers, according to recent analysis of data from a randomized, placebo-controlled study conducted in 1997 and 1998.

The study, which explored differences in administration and was funded by MedImmune, the maker of Flumist, appeared in the Dec 20 online edition of Vaccine. Self-administered flu vaccines could be useful in a pandemic mass immunization setting and could be a tool for making vaccination more efficient and less costly, the authors say.

<SNIP>

The research group found no significant difference in illness incidence between the two groups and observed comparable levels of reactions and adverse events 7 days after vaccination.
Dec 20 Vaccine
abstract

 

LAIVs are normally shipped  and stored at 35°F--46°F  (cite) - which makes mailing them problematic - but they could be easily distributed via drive thru windows or hand delivered to homes in neighborhoods.

 

LAIVs are particularly attractive during a pandemic because they can be produced in much larger quantities than Inactivated vaccines.

 

But there remain some questions regarding their effectiveness in adults, compared to the TIV (see Study: Nasal Flu Vaccines Generally Less Effective Than Shots In Adults).

 

Caveat: this study was based on seasonal flu vaccine strains used in the middle of the last decade, not on a newly emergent pandemic strain, and so the results may not be fully applicable.

 

Nevertheless, self-administered LAIVs have the potential to streamline vaccine delivery to a significant portion of the population during the next influenza pandemic. And with a novel flu, the quicker you can increase the levels of community immunity, the sooner the crisis will begin to abate.

»» Read More

BMC: Exploring The `Age Shift’ Of Pandemic Mortality

 

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The infamous `W shaped curve’ of the 1918 pandemic clearly shows that the death rates among those in their teens, 20s, and 30s was much higher than was normally seen in previous influenza years. Those over the age of 65, however, saw a reduction in mortality during the pandemic.

 

# 6778

 

Seasonal influenza can strike people of any age, but exacts its greatest toll on the elderly – those over the age of 65 whose weaker immune systems (and comorbid conditions) often render them less able to fight off the infection.

 

Exact numbers remain elusive, since influenza is only rarely cited as the primary cause of death. If a cause of death (beyond`natural causes’) is given, comorbidities like COPD, heart disease, asthma are far more likely to listed on a death certificate.

 

Still, estimates are that 90% of seasonal flu mortality occurs in those over the age of 65 (cite CDC Pink book).

 

In 2010, (see Study: Years Of Life Lost Due To 2009 Pandemic), researchers estimated the median age of death due to seasonal influenza-related illness in the United States to be 76.

 

In contrast, pandemic influenza strains, at least during the first few years after their introduction, often produce a dramatic `age shift’ downward in mortality. 

 

The CDC’s estimate of average and median age of death due to the 2009 Pandemic virus reads:

 

Based on two CDC investigations of confirmed 2009 H1N1-related deaths that occurred during the spring and fall of 2009, the average age of people in the U.S. who died from 2009 H1N1 from April to July of 2009 was 40. The median age of death for this time period was 43. From September to October of 2009, the average age of people in the U.S. who died from 2009 H1N1 was 41, and the median age was 45.

 

Admittedly, younger fatalities are more likely to be investigated, and documented, than those that occur among the elderly, but still . . . this is a significant shift.

 

And it corresponds closely to the results of the Years Of Life Lost Study mentioned above, which found the mean age of death from the novel H1N1 virus to be half that of seasonal flu, or 37.4 years.

 

In terms of years of life lost (YLL), the average pandemic flu death has a many fold greater impact than the average seasonal flu fatality.   

 

This same pattern was repeated (to greater and lesser degrees) during the 1918, 1957, and 1968 pandemics  . . .  along with the 1977 return of the H1N1 virus after an absence of 20 years.

 

All of which has led to a good deal of speculation.

 

What drives this age shift?  Why were apparently healthy, younger flu victims, with robust immune systems more likely to die from pandemic flu?

 

Although not universally accepted, one popular theory has centered around the production of a `cytokine storm’, which is believed to be the product of a robust immune system typically found in younger, healthier individuals.

 

Cytokines are a category of signaling molecules that are used extensively in cellular communication. They are often released by immune cells that have encountered a pathogen, and are designed to alert and activate other immune cells to join in the fight against the invading pathogen.

 

This cascade of immune cells rushing to the site of infection, that if it races out of control, can literally kill the patient.

 

The patient’s lungs can fill with fluid (which makes a terrific medium for a bacterial co-infection), and cells in the lungs (Type 1 & Type II Pneumocytes) can sustain severe damage.

 

You can find more on this theory in these earlier posts:

 

Study: Calming The Cytokine Storm
Cytokine Storm Warnings

The Baskin Influenza Pathogenesis Study

Pt. 1               Pt. 2            Pt. 3

 


Another theory has held that older populations are more likely to have been exposed to a similar influenza strain in the past and are more likely to carry some level of immunity to the emerging pandemic strain.

 

This was clearly the case in 1977, when the H1N1 virus – supplanted by the H2N2 virus in 1957 – made an unexpected comeback.  Those born after the virus last circulated in the mid 1950s – were the hardest hit age group.

 

Again with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus, those born before the early 1950s appeared to have higher levels of immunity, resulting in fewer severe outcomes among older individuals.

 

All of which serves as prelude to a research article, published yesterday in BMC Medicine, that looks at the age shift during pandemic outbreaks.

 

The age distribution of mortality due to influenza: pandemic and peri-pandemic

Tom Reichert, Gerardo Chowell and Jonathan A McCullers

Background

Pandemic influenza is said to 'shift mortality' to younger age groups; but also to spare a subpopulation of the elderly population. Does one of these effects dominate? Might this have important ramifications?

Methods

We estimated age-specific excess mortality rates for all-years for which data were available in the 20th century for Australia, Canada, France, Japan, the UK, and the USA for people older than 44 years of age. We modeled variation with age, and standardized estimates to allow direct comparison across age groups and countries. Attack rate data for four pandemics were assembled.

Results

For nearly all seasons, an exponential model characterized mortality data extremely well; For seasons of emergence and a variable number of seasons following, however, a subpopulation above a threshold age invariably enjoyed reduced mortality. 'Immune escape', a stepwise increase in mortality among the oldest elderly, was observed a number of seasons after both the A(H2N2) and A(H3N2) pandemics. The number of seasons from emergence to escape varied by country. For the latter pandemic, mortality rates in four countries increased for younger age groups but only in the season following that of emergence. Adaptation to both emergent viruses was apparent as a progressive decrease in mortality rates, which, with two exceptions, was seen only in younger age groups. Pandemic attack rate variation with age was estimated to be similar across four pandemics with very different mortality impact.

Conclusions

In all influenza pandemics of the 20th century, emergent viruses resembled those that had circulated previously within the lifespan of then-living people. Such individuals were relatively immune to the emergent strain, but this immunity waned with mutation of the emergent virus. An immune subpopulation complicates and may invalidate vaccine trials. Pandemic influenza does not 'shift' mortality to younger age groups; rather, the mortality level is reset by the virulence of the emerging virus and is moderated by immunity of past experience. In this study, we found that after immune escape, older age groups showed no further mortality reduction, despite their being the principal target of conventional influenza vaccines. Vaccines incorporating variants of pandemic viruses seem to provide little benefit to those previously immune. If attack rates truly are similar across pandemics, it must be the case that immunity to the pandemic virus does not prevent infection, but only mitigates the consequences.

The complete article is available as a provisional PDF.

 

The entire article is worthy of your attention, and the authors delve into a good many areas, including future pandemic mitigation planning, and vaccine strategies. 

 

But essentially the authors propose that all recent influenza pandemics (over the past century) have involved `recycled’ flu strains to which some portion of the population had previously been exposed to.

 

They conclude:


Pandemics do not ‘shift’ mortality to younger ages

From this study, it is evident that pandemics do not ‘shift’ mortality to younger ages. Rather, the
entire mortality level is simply reset to the virulence level of the emergent virus. This reset is accompanied by immunoprotection in older age groups, which is determined by their level of previous experience with viruses similar to that emerging. 

 


In other words, were older populations not carrying some vestiges of immunity from previously flu encounters, these researchers suggest they would suffer the same levels (or higher) of mortality and morbidity as do younger populations.

 

The authors also point out that initial levels of immunity to emerging (or more properly, re-emerging) influenza viruses in older populations tends to wane in subsequent seasons, leading to what they call Immune Escape: `a stepwise increase in mortality among the oldest elderly’.

 

Does this blow the whole cytokine storm theory out of the water?

 

Not necessarily, although it does call into question just how much of an impact it has on the perceived `age shift’ in pandemic flu cases.

 

These two theories need not be mutually exclusive, however, and so I wouldn’t rule out the possibility that both may play a part in driving pandemic mortality demographics.

»» Read More

WHO Europe: Revising Pandemic Preparedness Plans

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The current WHO phase of pandemic alert for avian influenza H5N1 is 3.

 

# 6725

 

 

While not the damp squib that many pundits have mistakenly called it (see Lancet: Estimating Global 2009 Pandemic Mortality), the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic could have been worse.

 

A lot worse.

 

As it was, the Lancet study mentioned above found:

 

We estimate that globally there were 201 200 respiratory deaths (range 105 700—395 600) with an additional 83 300 cardiovascular deaths (46 000—179 900) associated with 2009 pandemic influenza A H1N1. 80% of the respiratory and cardiovascular deaths were in people younger than 65 years and 59% occurred in southeast Asia and Africa.

 

As we’ve seen with some previous pandemics, the greatest burden of illness and death was shifted to those under 65, a reversal of what we normally see with seasonal influenza. 

 

Still, when compared to 1918 – where between 50 and 100 million people died – the pandemic of 2009 was relatively mild.


We may not be nearly so lucky the next time around.

 

Preparations for an H5N1 pandemic – which began in earnest in 2005 – undoubtedly helped the world respond in 2009, but it is quite clear the world remains poorly equipped to deal with a major global health crisis.

 

Earlier this year the World Health Organization  published a 16-page document that looked at the lessons learned from the 2009 pandemic, called:

 

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While the document goes into considerable detail, the following excerpt lists key areas where changes are recommended.

 

Key changes to national pandemic preparedness plans

 
The changes being made to pandemic plans follow to a large extent the findings from some evaluations performed by countries, as well as the two EU-wide assessments (TOR1 and TOR2) (7), the WHO/Europe evaluation of pandemic preparedness (8), the external review of the IHR (1) and of ECDC’s response to the pandemic (9). The changes address primarily the following areas:

  • intersectoral cooperation, collaboration and leadership
  • flexibility and adaptability of plans
  • strategies for vaccines and antivirals 
  • disease surveillance and monitoring of countermeasures
  • strategies for exchanging information and communicating risk
  • evaluation of the pandemic response and the transition to seasonal influenza.

 

Four countries (France, UK, Czech Republic, Finland) have updated their pandemic response plans since 2009, while many other countries are in the process of working on revisions.

 

You can view the latest versions of European national plans at this WHO Europe web address:

 

National preparedness plans

Follow the links below to view country-specific national pandemic preparedness plans.

(Continue . . . )

 

European pandemic guidance recommendations are being revised to more closely match the WHO global pandemic guidance. These new guidance recommendations will be presented at a WHO workshop in Copenhagen next month for countries of the South-eastern Europe Health Network (SEEHN), newly independent states, Switzerland and Turkey.

 

This from the World Health Organization:

 

 

 

Revising pandemic influenza preparedness strategies

16-11-2012

Evaluations of the response to the 2009 pandemic have shown that the world is ill-prepared to respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to any similar global, sustained and threatening public health emergency.

 

From the lessons learned it can be concluded that existing country pandemic plans have a number of gaps. Member States are in the process of revising their pandemic plans and 4 countries of the WHO European Region have published their revised plans.

 

A key activity of WHO/Europe in collaboration with the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) is to provide a strong and clear guide, so that all countries of the Region can revise their pandemic influenza preparedness strategies. To this end, the existing European guidance is being revised in line with revisions from the WHO global pandemic guidance. This new version of the European guide will be discussed during a workshop on pandemic preparedness that will be held 5-7 December 2012 in Copenhagen, Denmark for countries of the South-eastern Europe Health Network (SEEHN), newly independent states, Switzerland and Turkey.

 

The meeting is organized in collaboration with the SEE Regional Health Development Centre for Communicable Diseases Surveillance in Tirana, Albania and will be facilitated by experts from WHO collaborating centres at the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom and the University of Geneva, Switzerland as well as WHO headquarters.

 

Experts from ECDC and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Central Asian Region, Almaty, Kazakhstan will also participate.

»» Read More

Paper: Are We Prepared For A Pandemic In Low Resource Communities?

 

 

# 6713

 

One of the hard truths about pandemics is that they tend to disproportionately affect developing nations and low resource communities.

 

Back in 2006 we looked at a study that appeared in The Lancet that predicted, based on the 1918 pandemic experience, that a modern pandemic of similar virulence could claim 62 million lives, and that 96% of those deaths would occur in the developing world.

 

Estimation of potential global pandemic influenza mortality on the basis of vital registry data from the 1918—20 pandemic: a quantitative analysis

Prof Christopher JL Murray DPhil , Prof Alan D Lopez PhD, Brian Chin ScB, Dennis Feehan AB , Prof Kenneth H Hill PhD

 

The authors cited as much as a 30-fold difference in mortality rates around the world in 1918. Countries in Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan African were particularly hard hit.

 

Some of the reasons behind this disparity included.

 

  • lack of access to adequate medical care
  • weak public health infrastructures,
  • housing conditions and population density
  • nutritional status and
  • co-existing medical conditions.

 

For the most part many of these conditions still persist, plus developed nations today are more likely to have earlier access to antibiotics, antivirals, and eventually vaccines. Leading the authors to write:

 
Interpretation

This analysis of the empirical record of the 1918—20 pandemic provides a plausible upper bound on pandemic mortality. Most deaths will occur in poor countries—ie, in societies whose scarce health resources are already stretched by existing health priorities.

 

 

A grim scenario, and part of the rationale behind the creation of a program called the H2P  (Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness) Initiative geared towards promoting community & district-level pandemic flu preparedness and response in developing countries.

 

 

H2P (which began in 2007 & ended in 2010) was a joint effort by NGO’s and partner organizations, including USAID, IFRC, CORE Group (including American Red Cross, CARE, & Save the Children), AED, InterAction, & several UN agencies, including WHO, WFP, & UN OCHA.

 

During the 2009 pandemic I highlighted the H2P initiative’s efforts several times (see here, here, and here), and over the years have had occasional correspondence with Eric Starbuck at Save The Children, who was the H2P’s Public Health Advisor with the CORE Group.

 

I mention this past association because Eric is the lead author on a paper that appears today in the Journal Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses, that looks at the challenges (and provides some solutions) for helping low resource communities deal with an influenza pandemic.

 


The full article is available online, and is well worth reading in its entirety. 

 

Are we prepared to help low-resource communities cope with a severe influenza pandemic?

Eric S. Starbuck, Rudolph von Bernuth, Kathryn Bolles, Jeanne Koepsell

Article first published online: 12 NOV 2012

Recent research involving lab-modified H5N1 influenza viruses with increased transmissibility and the ongoing evolution of the virus in nature should remind us of the continuing importance of preparedness for a severe influenza pandemic.

 

Current vaccine technology and antiviral supply remain inadequate, and in a severe pandemic, most low-resource communities will fail to receive adequate medical supplies.

 

However, with suitable guidance, these communities can take appropriate actions without substantial outside resources to reduce influenza transmission and care for the ill. Such guidance should be completed, and support provided to developing countries to adapt it for their settings and prepare for implementation.

View Full Article (HTML)     Get PDF (71K)

 

In regions where antivirals, antibiotics, and vaccines (and even basic nursing care) may be unavailable, the only realistic protection against an influenza pandemic is the implementation of NPIs (Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions). 

 

We’ve talked about NPIs many times before, but primarily in the context of a developed or industrialized community.

 

NPI’s and Influenza

Our First Line Of Defense
Study: Effectiveness of NPIs Against ILI's

 

As Eric and his team point out:

 

Nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce influenza transmission at the household level may include keeping a distance from others, washing hands, covering one’s cough, and isolation of the ill.

 

However, several of these NPIs may not be very feasible in some settings, such as those with poor access to water or where many families live in small one-room dwellings.

 

Experience during the 2009 pandemic indicates that communication materials, such as those encouraging the practice of these NPIs, need to be adapted, tested, and approved for local use ahead of time. The absence of standardized, pretested messages was a challenge in 2009

 

A few samples of the type of guidance provided by H2P to low resource communities include:

 

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The authors conclude:

 

We believe that detailed authoritative guidance for resource-poor settings on NPIs to reduce influenza transmission at community level in a severe pandemic should be developed.

 

In addition, support should be provided to governments in developing countries to adapt this and other important guidance to their settings and plan to roll it out if needed.

 

We are not aware of ongoing efforts of this kind, but believe that this should be an urgent priority. We are concerned about this apparent gap in the most basic kind of preparedness for a severe pandemic.

 


 

It doesn’t take a pandemic to put people living in low resource communities at greater risk. That happens every day.

 

Agencies like the Red Cross, Red Crescent, CARE, Save The Children, UNICEF, and others are working around the world on a daily basis to combat poverty and disease, and are going to be on the front lines during any pandemic.

 

They could use your support.

 

These NGO’s do a great deal with very little, and even small donations can help make a difference.

 


A final note: For those curious about my mention in the acknowledgements section of this paper, I assure you my contribution was small, and unworthy of mention (but I’m appreciative, nonetheless). When asked, I suggested to Eric that the Journal Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses might be interested in his paper.

»» Read More

CSIRO: The Quest For Flu Resistant Poultry

 

 

# 6657

 

The idea of creating genetically modified chickens with a built-in resistance to the H5N1 virus has been around for some time, and given the threat posed by an avian flu pandemic, and the costs of the virus to the world’s poultry industry, I can understand the allure.

 

At the forefront of research in this field has been Australia's national science agency called CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation).

 

Below is a snapshot of a 2005 cover of CSIRO’s Livestock Research Magazine, where Cambridge University virologist Laurence Tiley stated, “The tools to make poultry resistant to flu infection already exist”. His bigger concern was whether they could persuade the public of the benefits of Genetically Modified (GM) poultry.

image

 
Since 2005, research on how best to make resistant poultry has been conducted at the Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL), a BSL-4 facility located in Geelong, Victoria.


Earlier this summer, CSIRO released a 7-minute audio podcast where one of their researchers – Dr Tim Doran – is interviewed about the research.

 

image

The audio and transcript are available at this link.

 

Overnight,  The Conversation – which is a combined journalistic effort by a number of Australian Universities – published details of a presentation by Dr. Doran at CSIRO’s Emerging Infectious Diseases Symposium, where he announced that the first `challenge study’ will be conducted on transgenic chickens later this year.

 

23 October 2012, 3.39pm AEST

 

Silencing the bird flu gene: scientists prep live hen trials

Researchers hoping to produce modified chickens hatched with in-built resistance to bird flu will conduct trials on live hens later this year, an Australian scientist said on Tuesday.

 

CSIRO research scientist, Dr Tim Doran, has been using a technique called gene silencing to “switch off” virus genes that make chickens susceptible to H5N1, the bird flu that has devastated livestock and killed 359 people worldwide since 2003.

(Continue . . .)

 


This experiment is being billed as a `proof of concept’, and given the regulatory hurdles that lie ahead, we are still quite some time away from seeing GM flu resistant chickens entering the food chain.

 

Assuming this challenge study works, the biggest barrier will be getting the public to willingly accept the idea of eating transgenic chicken & dumplings for Sunday dinner.

 

Although I’m not a part of the `anything genetically modified must be bad’ camp, I’m always mindful of the law of unintended consequences. History is filled with examples of experiments that `seemed like a good idea’ at the time, but turned out to be less so in the long run.

 

Two particularly famous examples of this law in action come from Australia. The introduction of rabbits for food stock in the 18th century, and the importation of the Cane toad (Bufo marinus) to control the cane beetle in 1935.

 

Both spread quickly as invasive and environmentally damaging species, and both continue to require expensive control programs to this day.

 

The rabbit overpopulation became such a problem in the 1950s, scientists deliberately released the Myxoma virus into the rabbit population. While that virus quickly decreased the rabbit population, the resistant survivors quickly re-gained lost ground.

 

Another attempt was made with the release  of RHD(Rabbit Hemorrhagic Disease) in the 1990s, and while initially effective, its efficacy appears to be waning (cite).

  

 

Given the furor we’ve seen over the release of GM mosquitoes (see Key West: Public Debate Over GM Mosquitoes), and some high profile miscalculations in the past, getting the public to accept transgenic chickens at this point may prove a hard sell.

 

Of course, one severe flu pandemic springing out of poultry, and public sentiment might change in a hurry.

»» Read More

University of Michigan: Influenza Encyclopedia 1918-1919

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The Motor Corps of St. Louis chapter of the American Red Cross on ambulance duty during the influenza epidemic, October 1918. Photo Credit – UM Influenza Encyclopedia Image Gallery

 

 

# 6641

 

I confess to being a major medical history buff, a predilection that began nearly a half century ago when I read James Leasor’s account of two pivotal years in the history of London (1665-1666) - which began with the Great plague, and ended with the Fire of London.

 

image

 

In the 1970s, after the Swine Flu scare of 1976 (see my account of that event in Deja Flu, All Over Again.), I often asked my patients (who had been teenagers or young adults in 1918) about their memories of the 1918 Spanish Flu.

 

And I’m currently reading (a gift from a friend: thanks, John)  Infectio., a fascinating history of infectious diseases and their early treatments, by Werner Schreiber and Friedrich Karl Mathys.

 


So I was particularly pleased to get a head’s up overnight from Eric Starbuck that the University of Michigan’s Center for the History Of Medicine has published their impressive digital encyclopedia (containing more than 18,000 historical documents) of the 1918 Spanish Flu Pandemic.

 

image

 

I’m just beginning to explore this site, but I’m very impressed with what I’ve seen so far.  Not only as a chronicle of the great pandemic, but also as a glimpse back at life in the United States nearly 95 years ago.


With this much to explore, I fear I won’t get much work done today.  But nevertheless . . .

 

Highly recommended.

»» Read More

Lancet: Public Response To The H1N1 Pandemic Of 2009

 

 

# 6610

 

 

During the opening months of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic – before a vaccine was available – about the only advice that public health departments could offer was that people practice good flu hygiene.

 

The CDC’s Action Steps released in September, 2009.

 

  1. Get your family vaccinated for seasonal flu and 2009 H1N1 flu.
  2. Cover your mouth and nose with a tissue when you cough or sneeze.  If you don’t have a tissue, cough or sneeze into your elbow or shoulder; not into your hands.
  3. Practice good hand hygiene by washing your hands often with soap and water, especially after coughing or sneezing.
  4. Stay home if you or your child is sick for at least 24 hours after there is no longer a fever or signs of a fever (without the use of fever-reducing medicine). Keeping sick students at home means that they keep their viruses to themselves rather than sharing them with others.

 

And variations of this advice was promoted pretty much worldwide, including this NHS promotion in the UK:

 

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While many people did adopt these practices, many did not.  In September of 2009 I wrote of my own encounter with with an unrepentant public sneezer in a blog called  `Being A Sneeze Guard’.

 

And in a blog called And Yet, They Still Call It Wellington, we looked at a New Zealand study that found poor flu hygiene compliance during the 2009 pandemic.

 

Today, The Lancet has published a review of flu compliance that has garnered a good deal of press overnight, particularly in Britain, where compliance was less than sterling.

 

Public response to the 2009 influenza A H1N1 pandemic: a polling study in five countries

Dr Gillian K SteelFisher PhD , Robert J Blendon ScD , Johanna RM Ward MSc , Robyn Rapoport MA , Emily B Kahn PhD , Katrin S Kohl MD

 

 

Although the full text is behind a pay wall, the Fergus Walsh with the  BBC has a report with some of the details.

 

Britons 'kissed through swine flu'

(Excerpt)

Researchers at Harvard School of Public Health in Boston questioned nearly 5,000 people. Just 25% of British people surveyed said they more frequently coughed or sneezed into their elbow or shoulder during the pandemic compared with 82% in Mexico and 84% in Argentina. Some 53% of Britons said they washed their hands or used hand sanitizer more frequently, compared with 89% in Argentina, and 72% in Japan and the US.

 

Just 2% of Britons said they avoided hugging or kissing family or friends compared with 46% of those questioned in Mexico and 21% in the US.

(Continue . . .)

 

 

It wasn’t just the general public displaying a cavalier attitude during the pandemic - something I wrote about in Hand Hygiene Among Doctors Exposed. That concerned an observational study conducted at two scientific conferences on the hand washing habits of doctors.

 

The first was the 26th Meeting of the Scandinavian Society on Antimicrobial Chemotherapy (SSAC) in Tromsø, Norway, and second took place at the International Congress on Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy (ICAAC) in San Francisco, CA.

 

Both took place in September 2009, during the height of the pandemic.

 

Observers stationed in the men’s and women’s restrooms kept track of the hand washing compliance among the men and women (mostly infectious disease specialists) attending these conferences.

 

The results, while better than others we’ve seen among the general public, were still less than comforting.

 

The study appeared in the  AJIC (American Journal of Infection Control) and was called:

 

Do as I say, not as I do: Handwashing compliance of infectious diseases experts during influenza pandemic

Anu Kantele, MD, PhD, Mari Kanerva, MD, PhD, Mikko Seppänen, MD, PhD, Jussi Sutinen, MD, PhD, Kirsi Skogberg, MD, PhD, Laura Pakarinen, MD, Iiro H.S. Jääskeläinen, MD, Inko Aho, MD, Asko Järvinen, MD, PhD, Taru Finnilä, MD Jukka Ollgren, PhD

 

The bottom line was that in San Francisco only 69% of the men were observed to wash with soap and water, and 86% of the women. Results from the conference in  Tromsø, Norway conference were even more disturbing, with just 38% of the men, and 84% of the women using soap and water.

 

You’ll find a lot more on this subject in Giving Germs A Helping Hand, which looked at low handwashing compliance among doctors and other healthcare providers.

 

To try to encourage better hand hygiene among health care providers, the CDC has a hand hygiene website  with  many resources, including a link to a new iPad/iPhone application called iScrub.

 

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Pathogens At the Gate

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Thermal Scanner – Credit Wikipedia

 

# 6593

 

While there are no indications that the coronavirus detected recently in the Middle East has spread beyond the first two cases, some places around the world are taking this threat very seriously.

 

For example, local media is reporting that thermal scanners have been deployed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in the Philippines in an attempt to screen arrivals from the Middle East for possible infection.

 

Whenever a novel virus appears, people’s thoughts understandably turn to a pandemic scenario, even though experience has shown that most emerging viruses don’t have the `legs’ to spark a global epidemic (see Novel Viruses & Chekhov’s Gun).

 

Nevertheless, history tells us that pandemics come along several times each century, and another pandemic is all but inevitable.

 

And so the world’s attention this week has quite naturally focused on the novel coronavirus that killed one man in Saudi Arabia last July and has a Qatari man currently hospitalized in London.

 

Memories of the SARS outbreak in 2002 and 2003 remain vivid, particularly in Asia, where the virus hit hardest.

 

Fortunately, while there is still much we don’t know about this emerging pathogen, there are no immediate signs that this virus poses a pandemic threat.

 

While we may not know when - or which virus - will spark the next global health crisis, we have pretty good idea how it will arrive in most countries.

 

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Scheduled airline traffic around the world, circa June 2009 – Credit Wikipedia

 

The world’s airlines carry 2.6 billion passengers each year, on more than 17 million flights.  And as the map above indicates, millions of them are international flights.

 

With most viral diseases having an incubation period of several days or longer, someone who is newly infected with a virus could change planes and continents several times before showing their first signs of illness.

 

Last July, in MIT: Contagion Dynamics Of International Air Travel we looked at a study appearing in PloS One, that simulated the early spread of a pandemic virus via air travel and ranked U.S. airports based on how much they contributed to the spread of the illness.

 

An excerpt from a report that appeared in MIT News.

 

New model of disease contagion ranks U.S. airports in terms of their spreading influence

Airports in New York, Los Angeles and Honolulu are judged likeliest to play a significant role in the growth of a pandemic.

Kennedy Airport is ranked first by the model, followed by airports in Los Angeles, Honolulu, San Francisco, Newark, Chicago (O'Hare) and Washington (Dulles). Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, which is first in number of flights, ranks eighth in contagion influence. Boston's Logan International Airport ranks 15th.

 

 

All of which begs the question, can we really screen, identify, and isolate infectious airline passengers before they can spread a pandemic virus?

 

 

Sadly, the evidence to date has not been very encouraging.

 

Last April, in EID Journal: Airport Screening For Pandemic Flu In New Zealand, we examined a study that found the screening methods used at New Zealand’s airport were inadequate to slow the entry of the 2009 pandemic flu into their country, detecting less than 6% of those infected.

 

New Zealand did not employ thermal scanners, although countries that did, didn’t fare much better.

  

Proving that `there’s no place like home’ during a global crisis, in Vietnam Discovers Passengers Beating Thermal Scanners, we saw evidence of passengers taking fever-reducers to beat the airport scanners in a desperate attempt to get home.

 

In December of 2009, in Travel-Associated H1N1 Influenza in Singapore, I blogged on a NEJM Journal Watch article on of a new study that has been published, ahead of print, in the CDC’s  EID Journal  entitled:

 

Epidemiology of travel-associated pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection in 116 patients, Singapore. Emerg Infect Dis 2010 Jan; [e-pub ahead of print]. Mukherjee P et al

Travel-Associated H1N1 Influenza in Singapore

Airport thermal scanners detected only 12% of travel-associated flu cases; many travelers boarded flights despite symptoms.

 

 

In June of 2010  CIDRAP carried this piece on a study of thermal scanners in New Zealand in 2008 (before the pandemic) presented at 2010’s ICEID.

 

Thermal scanners are poor flu predictors

Thermal scanners for screening travelers do moderately well at detecting fever, but do a poor job at flagging influenza, according to researchers from New Zealand who presented their findings today at the International Conference on Emerging Infectious Diseases (ICEID) in Atlanta.

 

And in early 2009, Helen Branswell penned an article for the Canadian Press, that stated:

 

Studies show little merit in airport temperature screening for disease

Monday, 16 February 2009 - 11:58am.

By Helen Branswell

TORONTO — Using temperature scanners in airports to try to identify and block entry of sick travellers during a disease outbreak is unlikely to achieve the desired goal, a report by French public health officials suggests.

(Continue. . .)

 

 

The evidence is pretty clear.

 

With the technology of today, coupled with likelihood of having many pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic carriers, there isn’t much hope to identify more than a fraction of infected travelers.

 

As far as the risk of catching a pandemic flu virus while a passenger on an airliner, in May of 2010 we saw a study that appeared in the BMJ that looked at that very topic (see BMJ: Flu Transmission Risks On Airplanes)

 

BMJ 2010;340:c2424

Research

Transmission of pandemic A/H1N1 2009 influenza on passenger aircraft: retrospective cohort study

Conclusions

A low but measurable risk of transmission of pandemic A/H1N1 exists during modern commercial air travel. This risk is concentrated close to infected passengers with symptoms. Follow-up and screening of exposed passengers is slow and difficult once they have left the airport.

 

Another study, conducted by researchers at UCLA and published in BMC Medicine in late 2009:

 

Calculating the potential for within-flight transmission of influenza A (H1N1)

Bradley G Wagner, Brian J Coburn and Sally Blower*

Results

The risk of catching H1N1 will essentially be confined to passengers travelling in the same cabin as the source case. Not surprisingly, we find that the longer the flight the greater the number of infections that can be expected. We calculate that H1N1, even during long flights, poses a low to moderate within-flight transmission risk if the source case travels First Class.

(Continue . . .)

 

 

While there will likely be intense public clamor to try to block the entry of a pandemic virus into this, or any other country, the truth is – it is highly unlikely that it will work.

Areas that receive a very small number of arrivals might be able to institute a quarantine system (see Can Island Nations Effectively Quarantine Against Pandemic Flu? ), but even then the ability to identify and isolate infected travelers won’t be 100%.

 

Still, even if the success rate is likely to be low, there may be some value in trying to limit the number of infected persons arriving into a country, particularly during the opening days and weeks of an outbreak.

 

The more introductions of a virus into a population, the more points it will have from which to spread.

 

Since it takes months to produce and deploy a vaccine, and time to prepare a society to deal with a pandemic, any delaying action that can reduce the speed and spread of the virus has value.

 

The takeaway from all of this is that we ignore global healthcare and infectious disease outbreaks – even in the remotest areas of the world – at our own peril.

 

Vast oceans and extended travel times no longer offer us protection, and there is no technological shield that we can erect that would keep an emerging pandemic virus out.

 

The place to try to stop the next pandemic is not at the gate, but in the places around the world where they are likely to emerge.

 

Which makes the funding and support of international public health initiatives, animal health initiatives, and disease surveillance ever so important, no matter where on this globe you happen to live.

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NIAID Video: How Influenza Pandemics Occur

 

 

 

# 6581

 

NIAID, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, has recently released a 3 1/2 minute video that explains, very nicely, the emergence and potential spread of new influenza viruses.

 

The NIAID Youtube Channel is a terrific resource, with more than 2 dozen informative videos, covering a variety of medical and research topics.


This video is somewhat similar to the NIAID video I highlighted last April (see NIAID Video: Antigenic Drift).

 

Well worth a look.

 

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IDSA: Pandemic and Seasonal Influenza Preparedness

 

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# 6556

 

This morning the IDSA (Infectious Disease Society of America) and the AMA held a 2-hour webinar as part of the launch of an updated set of IDSA guidelines designed to educate federal policymakers on the issues of Pandemic and Seasonal Flu preparedness.

 

You’ll find a summary of their recommendations, and the link to download the 24-page PDF file at IDSA webpage below:

 

 

Pandemic and Seasonal Influenza

 

IDSA Pandemic and Seasonal Influenza Principles for US Action

IDSA has published (September 2012) an updated set of Pandemic and Seasonal Influenza Principles for United States Action to educate federal policymakers about how best to prepare for and respond to seasonal and pandemic influenza.

 

IDSA's first set of principles was issued in 2007 (see previous version here).  IDSA's updated principles rely upon the experience of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic and are intended to assist the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and other agency officials as they establish priorities for implementation of the reauthorized Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA).

What Action Does IDSA Recommend?

IDSA strongly believes that much work remains ahead of us, and overall responses to seasonal influenza and pandemic preparedness must be closely interrelated. The Society calls for:

  • coordination between HHS and other U.S. government departments, as well as a need for better coordination within HHS, particularly concerning influenza vaccine efforts
  • establishing processes for continual review of critical and rapidly evolving components of influenza preparedness, such as the contents of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)
  • vigorously supporting the uptake of the annual influenza vaccine by health care workers including through the adoption of a mandatory approach (see IDSA's revised policy statement (PDF) for details)
  • significant and sustainable multi-year funding that may be used flexibly particularly by local health departments for "All-Hazards" preparedness

 

(Continue . . . )

 

While many items were discussed during today’s webinar, the take-away message is that while much progress has been made in recent years, the United States remains vulnerable to many pandemic and other biological threats.


Influenza is by far the best known threat, but isn’t the only pandemic possibility.

 

The IDSA Guideline, in its conclusion, sums it up this way:

 

Influenza remains among the greatest infectious disease threats to our nation and the global community.  Despite the investments and progress made in research and preparedness over the past decade, substantial gaps remain. The next influenza pandemic is inevitable, only the timing,  severity,  and point of origin remain unknown.  We cannot be complacent. We cannot afford to be penny-wise and pound-foolish,  eroding the  progress made and leaving our nation and the world vulnerable.  We must be prepared.

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An Increasingly Complex Flu Field

 

Influenza Timeline 2012

(Click to enlarge)

 

# 6534

 

 

Up until 1977  it was considered normal that only one strain of influenza A circulated at a time.

 

When a new pandemic strain appeared (as it did in 1918, 1957, and 1968), the existing seasonal strain – for reasons that weren’t well understood – would vanish, and in time the new pandemic virus would settle in as the seasonal flu.

 


But in 1977 something unprecedented happened.

 

The H1N1 flu virus – which had been replaced by the pandemic H2N2 virus in 1957 (only to be replaced by the H3N2 strain 11 years later) - suddenly reappeared after 20 years absence.

 

The theory is that it escaped from a Russian or Chinese lab’s freezer, as it was almost unchanged from a strain not seen since the early 1950s. 

 

It was dubbed the `Russian flu’, and for a while, slammed Emergency rooms and Flu wards in a big way.

 

Most adults had some immunity left over from their exposures before 1957, and so kids under 20 were the hardest hit.  But unlike in 1918, 1957, and 1968 – this new flu didn’t depose the old flu.

 

Instead we ended up with two major Influenza A strains bumping shoulders and jockeying for position.  Some years H3N2 would dominate, and other years it would be H1N1.

 

Further complicating matters we also have Influenza B viruses, which while generally regarded as less serious than influenza A, have divided into two distinct lineages (Yamagata & Victoria.

 

And they too compete each year for dominance.

 

Which leaves us with (currently) four major flu strains to contend with; 

  • A/H1N109
  • A/H3N2
  • B/Victoria
  • B/Yamagata

 

These viruses constantly change and evolve over time, and we often have several clades of each strain at any given time. The most recent ECDC: Influenza Virus Characterization found 5 genetically distinct H3N2 strains in circulation across Europe.

 

The recent emergence of a new – antigenically different H3N2 strain, along with the recent dominance of the Yamagata influenza B virus, has prompted a major change in this year’s flu vaccine.

 

  • The H1N1 component remains essentially unchanged, with the A/California/7/2009 (H1N1)pdm09-like  still recommended.
  • But the old A/Perth/16/2009 (H3N2)-like virus now gives way to the A/Victoria/361/2011 (H3N2)-like virus.
  • And the Victoria lineage B/Brisbane/60/2008-like virus will be replaced by a Yamagata strain; the B/Wisconsin/1/2010-like virus. 

 

Which makes getting the flu vaccine this fall doubly important, as it is likely that community immunity to both of these strains is low.

 

Beyond these four, keeping researchers up late at night is the fact that there are no fewer than six influenza viruses that – while not well adapted to humans  – keep trying to nudge their way into the human host pool.

 

Most people by now are aware of the concerns over the H5N1 `bird flu’, but less well known are the H7 avian strains, which have managed to jump to humans several times over the past decade.

 

  • In 2003 an outbreak of H7N7 at a poultry farm in the Netherlands went on to infect at least 89 people. Most of the victims were only mildly affected, but one person died.
  • In 2004 two people in British Columbia tested positive for H7N3 (see Health Canada Report) during an outbreak that resulted in the culling of 19 million birds.
  • In 2006 and 2007 there were a small number of human infections in Great Britain caused by H7N3 (n=1)  and H7N2 (n=4), again producing mild symptoms.

 

H9N2 is another avian strain that has, on rare occasions, infected humans and is believed to have some pandemic potential. Over the past dozen years a small handful of cases have been identified – mostly in Hong Kong (see CIDRAP Avian Influenza (Bird Flu): Implications for Human Disease).

 

  • In January of 2010, in H9N2: The Other Bird Flu Threat, I wrote about the World Health Organization  recommending the creation of a candidate vaccine virus for H9N2.

 


And since 2005 the CDC has been reporting a growing number of swine flu variants that have managed – on rare occasions – to jump to humans.

 

The three main flu strains circulating in pigs are:

  • H1N1
  • H1N2
  • H3N2

When one of these swine viruses jumps to a human host, it is then called a `variant’ virus. 

 

Up until last year, it was the trH1N1 swine virus (now called H1N1v) that had been most commonly reported. The numbers were very low – rarely more than 2 or 3 infections each year.

 

Over the past year, the focus has shifted to the H3N2v virus, which emerged in the summer of 2011. After a quiet winter and spring, this summer it has infected several hundred people in the Midwest – most (but not all) appear to have contracted it directly from exposure to pigs.

 

And as an added surprise, on Friday of last week we learned of 1 confirmed and 2 suspected cases of a variant flu strain that had only been reported twice during the previous 7 years, in Minnesota Reports Swine H1N2v Flu.

 

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Next week this chart will likely need updating.

 

There are other flu strains out there, of course.

 

Earlier this year, concerns were raised over an H3N8 flu virus that had killed seals off the coast of New England, and which conceivably could infect other mammals as well (see mBio: A Mammalian Adapted H3N8 In Seals).

 

And given the propensity for flu viruses to reassort (swap gene segments), the possibility of seeing an entirely new flu strain emerge can’t be ignored.

 

Nature’s laboratory is open 24/7, and unlike human researchers suffers neither from bureaucratic rules or budgetary constraints.

 

That said, history has shown that pandemic events only happen rarely; just three times during the last century (albeit with a couple of close-but-no-cigar events thrown in to keep us on our toes)

 

Even with all of these potential threats on the viral horizon we could easily see average flu season.

 

So far, none of these novel viruses has demonstrated the ability to transmit among humans in a sustained and efficient manner while producing significant illness.


And if we get lucky, they never will. 

 

But as schools open, and cooler weather arrives, the conditions conducive for the spread of influenza improve. And that holds true whether we are talking seasonal flu, or one of these upstart strains.

 

Today is day three of National Preparedness Month, and while most people think of emergency preparedness as something you do for hurricanes and earthquakes, flu epidemics are also worth planning for as well.

 

Preparedness should include practicing good flu hygiene (hand washing-sanitizing, covering cough & sneezes, staying home if sick) all year round, and getting the flu shot early each year.

 

No one can predict with certainty the kind of flu year we will see, and I certainly have no special insight into the matter. The CDC states it pretty succinctly:

 

What sort of flu season is expected this year?

Flu seasons are unpredictable. The CDC and WHO closely monitor flu cases to identify new viruses or potential epidemics or pandemics.

 

The CDC and the WHO obviously take pandemics and epidemics very seriously, which is reason enough for us to take a more in-depth look at pandemic preparedness later this month as National Preparedness Month continues.

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