Showing posts with label H5. Show all posts
Showing posts with label H5. Show all posts

Pre-Pandemic Vaccinations Revisited

 

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Photo Credit PHIL

 

# 6428

 

In the wake of the publication of the Fouchier & Kawaoka studies (see here & here) - which suggest that the H5N1 virus may be only a few mutations away from being able to transmit among mammals – once again concerns over the possibility of a bird flu pandemic have taken center stage.

 

Despite its relative mildness, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic demonstrated the difficulty (read: impossibility) of creating, manufacturing, and rapidly deploying an emergency pandemic vaccine to billions of people in the face of a fast spreading influenza virus.

 

Were an H5N1 pandemic to break out today, even with small quantities of a vaccine already stockpiled, the vast majority of people around the world would not see a vaccine in anything less than six to twelve months.

 

And while the true CFR (Case Fatality Ratio) of the H5N1 virus remains disputed (see Revisiting The H5N1 CFR Debate), many researchers still believe it has the potential to be as deadly – or deadlier – than the 1918 Spanish Flu.

 

All of which as recently led to the resurfacing of a controversial, but potentially life-saving idea: the creation and distribution of a pre-pandemic vaccine.

 

While we’ve discussed this idea before, it was recently aired in the journal Science in an article called:

 

Influenza: Options to Improve Pandemic Preparation

Rino Rappuoli, Philip R. Dormitzer

 

While other solutions, including development of a `universal vaccine’, and improvements in our capacity to quickly produce and distribute vaccines were on their list, number one on their hit parade was the creation and distribution of a pre-pandemic H5 vaccine.

 

A pre-pandemic dose of an adjuvanted H5N1 vaccine – even if it were not an exact match to an emerging pandemic strain – is expected would blunt the impact of the H5N1 virus while the population waits for the arrival of a booster shot.

 

This idea is explored today in a Reuter’s story:

 

ANALYSIS-Bird flu vaccine now? More than a shot in the dark

 

 

As this article points out, an effective pre-pandemic vaccination program could take 3 to 5 years to conduct, and would cost billions of currently hard-to-find healthcare dollars. 

 

One of the biggest obstacles would be the public’s reaction to accepting a vaccination against a virus that – as yet – does not routinely infect humans.   

 

And no doubt, the anti-vaccine and internet conspiratorialists would have a field day with such a program.

 

This proposal, however, isn’t new.

 

We looked at this option in May of 2010 (see The Prime Of Our Lives), when the Journal Nature ran an opinion piece by Dr. Klaus Stohr, former head of the World Health Organization's global influenza program, supporting the idea of global pre-pandemic vaccination.

 

The problem is (aside from the not-insignificant costs, logistics, and difficulties gaining public acceptance) is predicting which influenza strain is likely to emerge next.  

 

Few would have pegged the H1N1 virus – a cousin to one that had been circulating for decades – to show up as a pandemic virus in 2009.

 

Which means we could spend billions priming against an H5 pandemic, only to get blindsided by an H7 or H9 virus.

 

It’s a calculated risk, though many scientists would point out that an H5 pandemic – at least right now – seems to pose a greater risk simply due to its record of lethality in humans.

 

And in fact, this strategy was employed in Japan back in 2008, when their limited stockpile of H5N1 bird flu vaccine was about to expire. 

 

They decided to `store it’ in the arms of healthcare and public safety workers, rather than pour it down the drain (see Japan Begins Pre-Pandemic Inoculation Of Health Care Workers). A similar program was launched in 2010 (see Taiwan Offers Public Bird Flu Vaccinations.)

 

Of course, we won’t know how well this little experiment works until an H5N1 pandemic breaks out, and recipients of this vaccine are shown to have fared better than those who weren’t `primed’.

 

But the idea is rooted in science.

 

In the summer of 2008 we saw a study, published in the of The Journal of Infectious Diseases, which showed that people who received an experimental H5N1 vaccine in Hong Kong 8 years before developed a strong immune response after receiving a single booster shot of a clade 1 H5N1 vaccine.

 


Influenza vaccines have an exceptionally good safety record, yet when millions of shots are given a small number of adverse reactions – some of them serious – are expected to occur.

 

When a clear and immediate viral threat is at hand, it is fairly easy to accept the risk-benefit equation presented by accepting a vaccine. But when no threat currently exists, one’s tolerance for risk – no matter how slight – tends to diminish.

 

Making a pre-pandemic jab a tough sell to an increasingly dubious public.

 

While the science makes sense (and yes, I’d probably avail myself of a shot were it made available), when you add up the costs, public relation concerns, and the sheer logistics of delivering a pre-pandemic shot to hundreds of millions (or even billions) of people, you have a formidable task.

 

One that, despite the potential benefits, governments don’t appear to be inclined to undertake right now.

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Hong Kong: Gull & Peregrine Falcon Test Positive For H5 Virus

 

 

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# 6112

 

Despite few reports of infected wild birds from mainland China (no doubt due to less than robust surveillance and reporting), most years we hear of a dozen or more H5N1 infected migratory birds making it into Hong Kong.

 

With each announcement, calls go out to increase biosecurity measures at local poultry farms, and for citizens to avoid contact with sick or dead birds.

 

In December of 2008 Hong Kong saw their first outbreak of H5N1 in domesticated poultry in nearly 6 years. In early 2009 it was announced that the H5N1 outbreak was `likely’ caused by infected migratory birds.  See Wild Birds Eyed As Likely Source Of Hong Kong Bird Flu Outbreak.

 

Since them, local authorities have become even more diligent in their surveillance and testing of dead birds.

 

Today, the Hong Kong government has announced the discovery of two more birds, from two different locations in the city, that have tested positive for the H5 virus in preliminary testing

 

 

Peregrine falcon and black-headed gull test positive for H5 virus

February 1, 2012 Issued at HKT 18:47

Preliminary testing of a dead peregrine falcon in Tung Chung and a dead black-headed gull in Yuen Long have tested positive for the H5 avian influenza virus, a spokesman for the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD) said today (February 1), adding that further confirmatory tests are being conducted.

 

On January 30, the dead peregrine falcon and black-headed gull were found and collected in the park of Seaview Crescent, Man Tung Road, Tung Chung and Chun Yin Square Playground, Yuen Long respectively.

 

Peregrine falcons are rare winter visitors to Hong Kong, while the black-headed gull is a common visitor.

 

The spokesman said there were no poultry farms within three kilometres of where the dead peregrine falcon was found, but four chicken farms are within three kilometres of where the dead black-headed gull was found.  AFCD staff inspected the farms and found no abnormal mortality or symptoms of avian influenza among the chicken flocks. These farms will be put under enhanced surveillance.

 

In view of these cases, the AFCD has phoned poultry farmers to remind them to strengthen precautionary and biosecurity measures against avian influenza. Letters have been sent to farmers, pet bird shop owners and licence holders of pet poultry and racing pigeons reminding them that proper precautions must be taken.

 

The spokesman said the department would conduct frequent inspections of poultry farms and the wholesale market to ensure that proper precautions against avian influenza have been implemented. The department will continue its wild bird monitoring and surveillance.

 

"People should avoid personal contact with wild birds and live poultry and their droppings. They should clean their hands thoroughly after coming into contact with them. The public can call 1823 for follow-up if they come across suspicious sick or dead birds, including the carcasses of wild birds and poultry," the spokesman said.

 

(Continue . . . )

 

 

China ranks 174th in Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Index 2011/2012 (out of 179), while Hong Kong places 54th (not far below the United States which ranks 47th).

 

Which may help explain (in part, anyway) why most years we hear of more H5N1 infected birds from within the 426 sq. miles of Hong Kong than we do for the entire 3,704,426 sq. miles of mainland China.

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Australia Finds LPAI H5 On Two Duck Farms

 

 

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Victoria, Australia – Credit Wikipedia

# 6103

 

 

Overnight the wire services have been abuzz with news of the discovery of a low pathogenic form of of avian influenza (LPAI) on a couple of duck farms in Victoria, Australia.  

 

A few samples of the media coverage include:

 

Chicken safe to eat, despite Victorian bird flu

 

Bird flu detected in ducks near Melbourne

 

Bird flu outbreak sparks duck cull

 

While all of the stories (rightfully) point out that this is a low-path strain - and not considered to be a serious health hazard to humans – noticeably absent from any of the above reports is any identification of the strain of avian flu detected.

 

There are, of course, a great many LPAI strains out there, but only the H5s and H7s are required to be reported to the OIE because of their potential to evolve into a more pathogenic strain.

 

For a good background on avian influenza in agriculture I would invite you to visit CIDRAP’s  Avian Influenza (Bird Flu): Agricultural and Wildlife Considerations - Last updated January 21, 2012

 

 

A visit to Victoria’s Department of Primary Industries website solves the subtype mystery (stated to be H5), which is included in the following statement by Victoria’s Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Andrew Cameron.

 

 

Chief Veterinary Officer’s Avian Influenza Update

27 January 2012

The Department of Primary Industries (DPI) has quarantined a commercial duck farm in two locations north-west of Melbourne after birds there tested positive to Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI).

 

DPI Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Andrew Cameron said analytical tests carried out at the Australian Animal Health Laboratory at Geelong, Victoria, had given a positive response to low pathogenic H5 subtype avian influenza virus, prompting authorities to act immediately.

 

This low pathogenic subtype of avian influenza is not the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus affecting poultry and humans throughout much of Asia. The wider community is not at risk from this incident.”

 

Dr Cameron has said, “The virus is relatively harmless now, but we do not want to take the risk it could linger in bird populations and mutate to a more virulent strain.”

 

The farm has been placed under strict quarantine and no birds, eggs, meat or associated equipment can be taken off the property.

 

The Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD) will meet on Friday 27 January, to discuss containment, surveillance and next steps.

 

Victoria’s Acting Chief Health Officer Dr Rosemary Lester reinforced the assurances that the public is not at risk. “Our poultry meat and eggs continue to be safe under normal food handling and cooking arrangements” she said.

 

For further information about Avian Influenza review the links below or call 1300 135559.

 

In Victoria, strict biosecurity guidelines apply to all poultry farms to prevent poultry, feed and water from mixing with wild birds. This minimises the risk of disease. It is a good practice to protect the food and water used for your pet birds and to ensure wild birds cannot come into contact with them. Finally, it is important for all of us to follow good hygiene practices to minimise the risk of any disease, such as washing hands after contact with animals and birds and, in particular, not handling sick or dead birds. These are sensible precautions that will prevent many diseases, not just AI.

Dr Andrew Cameron
Chief Veterinary Officer, Victoria

 

You’ll find another press release on this site, providing greater detail on the steps that are being taken to eradicate this virus.

 

Media release: Swift Action to Contain Avian Influenza

27 January 12

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