# 6173
Over the past two days we’ve seen two highly divergent papers come out on the probable spread, and Case Fatality Rate, of the H5N1 virus in the human population.
The lead author of the first one was Peter Palese and the second Michael Osterholm. Both are scientists of considerable reputation in the world of infectious diseases.
You can access them via my blogs below:
Science: Peter Palese On The CFR of H5N1
mBio: Mammalian-Transmissible H5N1 Influenza: Facts and Perspective
In 25 words or less, though:
Professor Palese maintains that seroprevalence studies suggest `millions’ of uncounted H5N1 infections, and would indicate the virus is nowhere near as deadly as has been proclaimed.
Osterholm cites flaws in some of those studies, and using WHO guidelines for testing, finds scant evidence to support the idea that many cases go uncounted, and the CFR is low.
Shamefully simplistic summaries on my part, but we’ve covered this territory many times in the past few days. I would encourage everyone to read both papers in their entirety.
In the wake of their publication, we are starting to see some media coverage and comparison of the two papers, and reactions from other scientists on this issue.
First stop, Reuters, which has a long report on this controversy, which was published before the mBio paper was released this morning.
Bird flu may not be so deadly after all, new analysis claims
NEW YORK | Fri Feb 24, 2012 6:38am EST
Despite the title, this report does quote the World Health Organization as standing behind their numbers, and has comments by Arturo Casadevall and Michael Osterholm disputing Palese’s results.
Next, New Scientist has a report by Debora MacKenzie that looks at the debate, and along the way she posits a theory of her own.
New doubt over H5N1 death rate – but risks still high
16:50 24 February 2012
And lastly, Lisa Schnirring of CIDRAP News has undertaken a difficult task and (skillfully, I think) has put together a comparison of the two papers.
She includes reactions from several leading scientists (including Gaun Yi and Marc Lipsitch) who have read the papers.
Debate on H5N1 death rate and missed cases continues
Lisa Schnirring
Staff Writer
Feb 24, 2012 (CIDRAP News) – Two leading voices on the potential threat of lab-modified H5N1 viruses laid out their arguments about the human H5N1 fatality rate and undetected cases today and yesterday, with one group claiming "millions" likely have been infected and the other group saying current World Health Organization (WHO) fatality-rate estimates are about right.
While this is a fascinating debate, and I know just about everyone would like to know the true CFR of the H5N1 virus (myself included), I’m not sure how much value (or comfort) that we would derive if we had that knowledge.
First, we tend to talk about the H5N1 virus as if it were a single, monolithic virus.
It isn’t.
There are more than 20 identified clades (and growing), with many minor variations within each clade.
If we could figure out the CFR for the clades commonly found in Indonesia (2.1.1, 2.1.2. and 2.1.3), it probably wouldn’t tell us much about those circulating in Egypt (2.2.1 and 2.2).
And it might tell us even less about the CFR of some future human-adapted H5N1 virus that may one day appear.
As any prospectus will warn you, Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
So even if we were accept that Professor Palese is correct, and the CFR of currently circulating H5N1 strains are somewhat less than 1%, I’m not exactly comforted by that knowledge.
I think what is important here is that this virus has been shown to provoke severe, often devastating illness in nearly all of the humans cases we’ve confirmed so far. It also seems to have a preference for younger victims.
Admittedly, that could change as the virus evolves.
But it is enough to convince me that we need to regard this virus as a dangerous and formidable pathogen, regardless of whether its CFR right now turns out to be 30% or .3% or somewhere in between.
Because if a new and improved version of the virus ever emerges, all of the old arguments (and datasets) will quickly become academic.
Related Post:
- Health Vigilance For The Chinese New Years
- Indonesia: H5N1 Clade 2.3.2 Reaches Bali
- H5N1 in 2012: The Year in Review
- Egypt: A Paltry Poultry Vaccine
- CIDRAP News Coverage Of The H5N1 NIH Workshop
- Watching Indonesia Again
- WHO: H5N1 Update
- Hong Kong: H5N1 Vaccine Recommended For Certain Lab Workers
- Indonesia MOH Reports Bird Flu Fatality
- VOA Report On The Indonesian Duck Die Off
- Dr. Alan Hampson Interview On Indonesia’s New Bird Flu Clade
- Report: Clade 2.3.2 H5N1 Detected In Indonesia
- India: The H5N1 & Migratory Birds Debate
- Bangalore: More Poultry Culled Due To H5N1
- HHS: Call For Public Comment On H5N1 Research
- Nepal: H5N1 Outbreak In Poultry
- mBio: Should The H5N1 Research Moratorium End?
- Vietnam Reports Progress On New Bird Flu Vaccine
- Vietnam: Ministry Bans Transport Of Waterfowl Over H5N1 Fears
- China Reports H5N1 Outbreak In Poultry
- Watching Egypt
- V Said, C Said
- Vietnam Intensifies Bird Flu Prevention Efforts
- Indonesia Announces H5N1 Fatality
- EID Journal: Persistence Of H5N1 In Soil
- Revisiting The H5N1 CFR Debate
- Differences In Virulence Between Closely Related H5N1 Strains
- Another Entry Into The H5N1 Lethality Debate
- mBio: Mammalian-Transmissible H5N1 Influenza: Facts and Perspective
- Science: Peter Palese On The CFR of H5N1
- CIDRAP: Exploring the CFR Of H5N1
- Racaniello On H5N1’s Fatality Rate
- The Numbers Disconnect
- Gauging The Severity Of A Pandemic
- The Tip Of The Iceberg
- Dead Reckoning
- Numbers Don’t Tell The Whole Story
- Royal Society H5N1 Symposium: Day 2
- The Scientist: Deliberating H5N1 Research
- NSABB To Re-examine H5N1 Research Risks
- Dysfunctional Science
- Laurie Garrett Dissects The Rationale For H5N1 Research
- The H5N1 Research Credibility Gap
- Laurie Garrett Blogs On The H5N1 Research Controversy
- mBio: The H5N1 Biosafety Level Debate
- Science Magazine: NSABB Members React To Fouchier Statement
- New Scientist: Mutant H5N1 Still Deadly
- ECDC Risk Assessment On H5N1 Transmissibility Studies
- CIDRAP News: NSABB May Revisit H5N1 Research
- Webcast: Discussion Of NSABB’s H5N1 Recommendations
- Peter Sandman On H5N1 Research Risk Communications
- Laurie Garrett Blogs On The H5N1 Research Controversy
- WHO News Release On Geneva H5N1 Technical Meeting
- WHO Releases List Of Participants At H5N1 Meeting In Geneva
- Branswell On the CFR Of H5N1
- Nature Editorial: Facing Up To Flu
- Declan Butler: Lab flu may not aid vaccines
- Video: NYAS H5N1 Debate
- H5N1 Research: A Plethora Of Positions
- NSABB Statement, mBio Commentaries & A `Dual Use’ Webinar
- PBS: Ebright, Racaniello, & Zimmer Weigh In On Bird Flu Research
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