# 6064
As the debate over policing scientific research to prevent potentially dangerous information from getting into the hands of terrorists heats up, we’ve another commentary today from Pulitzer-prize winning journalist and author Laurie Garrett.
You may recall that Ms. Garrett weighed in on this topic in mid-December (see Referral: Laurie Garrett On The Bird Flu Research Controversy).
Although the focus is currently on H5N1 research (and its potential for bioterrorism) these issues are hardly new, nor are they restricted to influenza.
From a 100 percent lethal form of mousepox developed by Australian researchers in 2001, to the use of reverse genetics to create reassortant influenza viruses, scientists around the globe are increasingly able to tweak and genetically manipulate pathogens in the laboratory.
I’ve blogged often on (legitimate and important) research projects to create reassortant (and potentially deadlier or more transmissible) viruses for study in the laboratory.
Last July in H5N1: A Rite Of Passage we looked at how serial passage studies are conducted, and at one in particular that appeared in the Journal of Animal and Veterinary Advances that looked at increases in pathogenicity (in mice) of two H5N1 viruses after six serial passages in quail.
Another study published that month, profiled in PNAS: Reassortment Potential Of Avian H9N2, we looked at the reassortment potential of the avian H9N2 virus and H1N1.
And in Study: Reassorted H1N1-H5N1 Produced Virulent Strain, we looked at work conducted by researchers at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital who created several reassortant 2009 pH1N1 viruses with individual genes borrowed from a 1997 H5N1 virus.
Rapid advances in scientific knowledge and technology over the past decade now enable even small labs to do the kind of research once thought impossible. Added to that, the internet facilitates private, back channel sharing of information like never before.
With this proliferation and decentralization of scientific research and technology come many thorny problems to address.
Prime among them is whether it is desirable (or even possible) in today’s digitally interconnected world to restrict access to - or the pursuit of - potentially dangerous scientific knowledge.
Follow the link to read Ms. Garrett’s commentary on this complex, and difficult topic:
LAURIE GARRETT | senior fellow for global health, Council on Foreign Relations | Posted: Wednesday, January 11, 2012 4:00 am
A reminder, tomorrow at 3PM EST Science Magazine will hold a one hour online chat on science and censorship (see ScienceLive Chat On H5N1 Research And Censorship).
